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Abstract
This thesis comprises three essays on monetary and international economics. The
first essay studies two issues of countries’ exchange rate regime (ERR) choices: why
countries peg and, if they peg, how they choose their anchor currency. Using spa-
tial analysis, I found that countries are likely to follow the ERR of “neighbour-
ing” countries, and countries’ ERR are jointly determined by network e↵ects and
country-specific factors. The findings indicate that countries may achieve higher
welfare by jointly choosing their ERRs with their major partners through coopera-
tion and negotiation. In the second essay, I am trying to answer the question why
countries target the particular variables they target by studying the determinants of
countries’ monetary policy regimes (MPRs). The study focuses on original OECD
member countries, and I develop a chronology of countries’ de jure MPRs for early
OECD member countries for the post-Bretton Woods period. I also study the de-
terminants of countries’ monetary policy arrangements based on de facto analysis
with Cobham’s (2015) classification as the cross-reference. The results suggest that
economic size, trade openness, financial development and political environment all
have a role in determining the MPR. The third essay studies two main by-products
of financial integration: contagion and risk sharing. I set up a Huggett (1993) type
heterogeneous agent model with di↵erent types of countries, and try to fill the gap
in the literature by exploring the impact of financial integration on consumers with
di↵erent wealth status. The main findings indicate that lenders and borrowers in
countries with current account surpluses and deficits respond to the financial crisis
asymmetrically. Moreover, the relationship between financial integration and con-
sumption smoothing is not monotonic, indicating that there is a trade-o↵ between
the benefits of international risk sharing and the costs of financial contagion induced
by unexpected negative shocks as observed in recent history.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
Monetary economics has long been an important branch of economics. There were
disputes about the importance of monetary policies lead by Keynes and Friedman.
Keynes and policy makers in his time thought that money does not matter except
for keeping interest rates low, but the high inflation caused by a long period of
low interest rates cast doubts on that idea. Then economists began to assign much
more value to monetary policy, and to think the general goal of monetary policy
includes maintaining a low unemployment rate and a high growth rate as well as a
stable price level. Friedman’s ideas are mostly in line with those economists, but
recognize the limitations of monetary policy in the long run. Neither interest rates
nor unemployment rates can be pegged for long. Over time, a considerable degree
of consensus among economists and policy makers is reached: money can influence
demand and unemployment in the short run, but is neutral in the long run.
With the recognition of the importance of money, studies on monetary economics
have grown. Arestis and Mihailov (2011) classify recent literature on monetary
economics into three fundamental fields and list six “innovative” extensions. The
fundamental fields include monetary theory, monetary policy and public finance.
The first two essays of the thesis are concerned with monetary policy. The conduct
of monetary policy is sophisticated. The primary goal of monetary policy is to main-
tain price stability and for some countries, to maintain output stability at the same
time, though Tinbergen’s rule challenges the notion of monetary policy with multi-
ple objectives. The policy tool of monetary policy is restricted, to either monetary
base or interest rates. Quantitative easing is a relatively new tool and is still the
subject of a fair amount of disputes. The choice of intermediate target is relatively
open, ranging from inflation, exchange rates, monetary base to discretionary frame-
work. The operation of monetary policy was unstructured before the 1980s. Since
then there has been a wide endorsement of inflation targeting and the Taylor-rule
type of policy strategies. We would like to believe the conduct of monetary policy
is more scientific nowadays. In addition, though monetary policy is widely deemed
as a domestic policy except for monetary union members, it is largely influenced by
other countries and world environments. The study of monetary economics under
the assumption of a closed economy is impracticable. Policy makers need to adopt
a feasible monetary policy regime for their countries and also consider the arrange-
ments of exchange rate policy. A strand of studies such as Edwards (1996), Edwards
(1998), Poirson (2001), Juhn and Mauro (2002), Levy Yeyati et al. (2010), Carare
and Stone (2006) has tried to figure out why countries choose particular monetary
policy arrangements, and the first two essays fit in this subset of monetary policy
studies. The third essay is closer to international than monetary economies. It
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studies the trade-o↵ between the benefits of international risk sharing and the cost
of financial contagion. The topic is under a cross-field of monetary and interna-
tional economics, financial integration, that Arestis and Mihailov (2011)’s survey
and the Handbook of Monetary Economics (1990, 2010) do not cover. This strand
of literature consists of topics on international capital flows, risk sharing, financial
contagion, capital controls, exchange rate theories, and countries’ balance sheets.
The first essay of the thesis studies two old issues of countries’ exchange rate regime
(ERR) choices: why countries peg and, if they peg, how they choose their anchor
currency. Previous studies focused on the use of country-specific factors to explain
countries’ exchange rate regime choices. However, though some papers found strong
correlation between idiosyncratic factors and ERR choices, these factors cannot
fully explain the contemporary movement of the choices. It is possible that large
swings in regime choices are caused by network e↵ects: a few countries change their
ERRs and other countries follow. Meissner and Oomes (2009) is the first paper
to explicitly study the role of network e↵ects on countries’ ERR choices. Network
externalities are actually implicit in the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) view. Since
transaction costs between two countries depend on their bilateral exchange rate
volatility, one country’s optimal ERR choice is reasonably a function of the other
country’s choice. This network externality may lead to multiple equilibria, which
may cause path dependence and coordination failure (Arthur (1989)). As outlined
in a two-player game theory model in Meissner and Oomes (2009), though two
countries’ optimal ERR choice is pegging to the USD (dollar-dollar choice), they may
end up with pegging to the euro (euro-euro choice) to avoid the dollar-euro or euro-
dollar situation if they start from the euro-euro position. If this snowball e↵ect is true
for countries’ decisions, we should be able to observe spatial autocorrelations among
countries’ ERR choices. Using spatial analysis, I found that countries are likely
to follow the ERR of other countries, and countries’ ERRs are jointly determined
by network e↵ects and country-specific factors. The findings indicate that countries
may achieve higher welfare by jointly choosing their ERRs with their major partners
through cooperation and negotiation.
In the second essay, I am trying to answer the question why countries target the
particular variables they target by studying the determinants of countries’ monetary
policy regimes (MPRs). For most developed countries nowadays, the primary goal
of monetary policy is to maintain price stability, which means ensuring low inflation.
In the aftermath of the end of the Bretton Woods system, many countries are not
exclusively concerned with inflation. Some countries have targeted inflation directly
and some have targeted other factors such as exchange rates to control it. The study
focuses on original OECD member countries, and in order to find the determinants,
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I develop a chronology of countries’ de jure MPRs for early OECD member coun-
tries for the post-Bretton Woods period. The classification is based on a variety
of sources and will be discussed in detail. The chronology of countries’ MPRs is
presented in section 3.2. I also study the determinants of countries’ monetary policy
arrangements based on de facto analysis with Cobham’s (2015) classification as the
cross-reference. The results suggest that economic size, trade openness, financial
development and political environment all have a role in determining the MPR.
The third essay studies two main by-products of financial integration: contagion
and risk sharing. I set up a Huggett (1993) type heterogeneous agent model with
di↵erent types of countries, and try to fill the gap in the literature by exploring
the impact of financial integration on consumers with di↵erent wealth status. We
formalise two types of countries: Type I countries have a high domestic equilibrium
interest rate and run a current account deficit; Type II countries have a low domestic
equilibrium interest rate and a current account surplus. The main findings indicate
that lenders and borrowers in countries with current account surpluses and deficits
respond to financial crisis asymmetrically. Moreover, the relationship between fi-
nancial integration and consumption smoothing is not monotonic, indicating that
there is a trade-o↵ between the benefits of international risk sharing and the costs
of financial contagion induced by unexpected negative shocks as observed in recent
history.
There are topics that are important in monetary and international economics but
not covered in this thesis. Money supply and money demand are the basis of mon-
etary economics and even today remain puzzling in some aspects. Interest rates
and simple policy rules have been under discussion since the 2008 financial crisis.
Economists are debating whether policy rules should take asset price or exchange
rates into account. The transmission mechanism of money is complicated, and
there are growing spill-over e↵ects from other countries to complicate the conduct
of domestic policy. Forward guidance is explicit guidance for the future conduct of
monetary policy to the public. It is an additional tool to anchor private expecta-
tions of inflation and interest rates. Central bank design is closely linked with the
credibility of policy makers and largely influence the conduct of monetary policy.
There is a trend to make central banks more independent and transparent. Pol-
icy evaluation is an important branch of economics. Though this thesis proposes
several policy implications, it does not include the evaluation of monetary poli-
cies. The dynamics of inflation and inflation expectations are the core of monetary
economics. However this thesis does not study this area directly. There are sev-
eral cross-fields between monetary and other areas of macroeconomics such as fiscal
policies, financial markets and asset pricing. This thesis discusses some aspects of
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financial markets but not other areas. Many subsets of microeconomics including
policy games, information, learning, contracts and mechanism design are interesting
extensions of monetary economics. This thesis points out several potential ways to
incorporate microeconomics with international monetary economics but does not
cover this area massively.
This thesis comprises three studies on monetary and international economics. The
structure of the thesis is as follows. The first chapter is an introduction to the
research area and key ideas of the thesis. The second and third chapters present
empirical studies on countries’ exchange rate regime and monetary policy regime
choices respectively. The fourth chapter is a theoretical study on the trade-o↵ be-
tween the two by-products of financial integration, international risk sharing and
financial contagion. The fifth chapter summarises the key results from the thesis
and their policy implications.
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CHAPTER 2 – NETWORK EFFECTS OF COUNTRIES’
EXCHANGE RATE REGIME CHOICES: A
SPATIAL ANALYSIS
2.1 Introduction
”No regime is likely to serve all countries at all times” (Ghosh, 1996, p. 12). There
are pros and cons of fixed exchange rates. Countries which peg compromise their
monetary autonomy and face the challenges of real shocks while significantly reduc-
ing their exchange rate volatility and transaction costs. This paper studies two old
issues about countries’ exchange rate regime (ERR) choices - why countries peg and,
if they peg, how they choose an anchor currency - with some novel methodologies
and ideas in exchange rate policy research.
Figure 2.1 shows countries’ ERR in the year 2004. It suggests that the choices of
ERR are clustered in the space: countries are likely to adopt the same ERR as
countries near them. In figure 2.2, the graph shows not only ERR but also anchor
currency choice of countries with fixed exchange rates. Countries’ anchor choices
show the similar pattern of space dependence.
Figure 2.1: Countries’ ERR choices in the year 2004
I use de facto ERR based on the coarse classification of Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2004). Hard peg
includes fine classification 1 to 4. Crawling peg includes fine classification 5 to 9. Intermediate
includes fine grid 10 to 12 and float includes fine grid 13.
The cluster between countries’ ERR choices might be attributed to country-specific
factors such as political institutions: Asian countries generally have weak political
institutions and are more likely to adopt pegs or crawling pegs; North American
countries mostly have good political institutions and prefer floating ERR. Figure
2.3 consists of two cartogram maps of countries’ ERRs. A cartogram map combines
5
Figure 2.2: Countries’ ERR and anchor currency choices in the year 2004
I use de facto ERR based on the coarse classification of Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2004). Intermediate
includes fine grid classification 10 to 12 and float includes fine grid 13. For crawling peg and hard
pegs (with fine grid 1 to 8), I classify couturiers ERR based on the anchor curreny instead of the
degree of peg.
statistical information with geographical information. Di↵erent from conventional
maps, the values of certain variables substitutes for the area of the units. Here the
colour represents the choice of ERR and the size represents trade openness in the
left-hand map and veto points 1 in the right-hand map. Cartograms are di↵erent
from standard box or bar plots since they keep the geographical location of the
units in the graph. We can see the space cluster of the ERR choices more clearly
from the circles in the Cartograms. If countries with lower (high) trade openness
are more likely to float instead of pegging to an anchor currency, we should observe
that the large (small) circles on the left figure are mostly light blue. Similarly, If
countries with lower (high) veto points are more likely to float instead of pegging
to an anchor currency, we should observe that the large (small) circles on the right
figure are mostly light blue. However, the size and colour of countries are not
systematically associated in both sub-figures, which means that trade openness and
veto points fail to explain countries’ ERR choices.
Similarly, if it is country-specific factors that determine countries’ anchor currency
and ERR choice, then we should observe a systematic association between colour and
size in figure 2.4, in which the size of each circle represents the degree of trade open-
ness on the left and veto points on the right while the colour represents countries’
choice of anchor currency and ERR. However no systematic association between size
(idiosyncratic factors) and colour (anchor currency and ERR choices) is found.
1Veto points measure the extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision-making powers
of chief executives. The veto points index in Heniszs Polcon Database(2005) directly measures the
di culties or steps required by the executive of a legislature to push his or her agenda. Nations
with no legislature nor e↵ective veto points are assigned the highest score. The index can be seen
as a proxy for political weakness.
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Figure 2.3: Cartogram map of countries’ ERR choices
The colour of each country represent the choice of ERR (Light blue: Free floats; Dark blue:
Intermediate; Light green: Crawling pegs; Dark green: Hard pegs). The size of each country
represents trade openness (left) and veto points (right) instead of area.The data source of veto
points and trade openness is listed in table 2.3.
Figure 2.4: Cartogram map of countries’ anchor currency and ERR choices
The colour of each country represent the choice of ERR (Light blue: Free floats; Dark blue:
Intermediate; Light green: Peg to the euro; Dark green: Peg to the USD). The size of each country
represents trade openness (left) and veto points (right) instead of area. The data source of veto
points and trade openness is listed in table 2.3.
Meissner and Oomes (2009) is the first paper to explicitly study the role of network
e↵ects on countries’ ERR choices. Network externalities are actually implicit in the
Optimum Currency Area (OCA) view. Since transaction costs between two countries
depend on their bilateral exchange rate volatility, one country’s optimal ERR choice
is reasonably a function of the other country’s choice. This network externality
may lead to multiple equilibria, which may cause path dependence and coordination
failure (Arthur (1989)). As outlined in a two-player game theory model in Meissner
and Oomes (2009), though two countries’ optimal ERR choice is pegging to the USD
(dollar-dollar choice), they may end up with pegging to the euro (euro-euro choice)
to avoid the dollar-euro or euro-dollar situation if they start from the euro-euro
position. The paper uses the trade-weighted number of trade partners who peg to the
same anchor currency as a measure of trade externalities and concludes that currency
network e↵ects exist, given that the coe cient on trade externalities is significantly
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positive. Similarly, Bleaney and Tian (2012) find that the benefits of fixed exchange
rates work largely through currency networks. Bilateral exchange rate volatility
is lower if both currencies are pegging to the same anchor. This research aims to
study the network e↵ects of countries’ ERR choices using spatial analysis. This
method of studying the network e↵ects is intuitive and able to provide a clearer way
to incorporate the transmission channel. There have been debates on whether the
heterogeneity of countries plays a significant role in deciding countries’ ERR. This
model will examine the significance level of idiosyncratic determinants proposed by
early studies as well. If spatial autocorrelation is significant after controlling for
idiosyncratic factors, there are network e↵ects in countries’ ERR choices: countries
are likely to follow the ER policy of their neighbours.
The next section reviews several critical papers on the determinants of ERRs and
some literature on the network e↵ects of exchange rate policies. Levy Yeyati et al.
(2010) find that many determinants of ERR identified by theoretical studies are
significant, while Juhn and Mauro (2002) reject the relevance of nearly all deter-
minants. The ideas, methodology, data selection and model specification of these
papers will be discussed in detail. There is only a limited literature on currency
networks.
The third section introduces the methodology used in spatial analysis. The spatial
econometrics helps to identify the influence of neighbours’ decisions on one country
explicitly: y = ⇢Wy + X  + ✏, where y is the vector of discrete variables (0 for
hard pegs, 1 for crawling pegs, 2 for intermediate exchange rates and 3 for free
floats), ⇢ is the spatial parameter to capture the spatial autocorrelations, W is the
weighting matrix and X is the vector of the idiosyncratic determinants of countries’
choices. The strength of the impacts of neighbour’s choices on a country is jointly
decided by ⇢ and W. The intuition of spatial econometrics is not complicated but
it requires heavy computational intensity. The Bayesian MCMC estimator will be
used to estimate spatial autoregressive multinomial probit (SAR MNP) model.
The results will be presented in section four. Currency network e↵ects are strong:
countries tend to follow the choices of their neighbours. However, for country-specific
determinants, the models come to di↵erent conclusions. Section five will discuss the
implications and drawbacks of the results.
2.2 Literature Review
Juhn and Mauro (2002) survey previous studies and find that there is no conclusive
evidence showing how countries choose their ERRs. The literature surveyed is from
8
the 1970s (e.g. Heller (1978)) to the 2000s (e.g. Poirson (2001) ), from cross-sectional
to panel studies, and from de jure to de facto classifications, and the methods
adopted in the studies vary from probit to multinomial logit. The determinants
considered by the early studies are numerous, including the size of an economy,
financial integration, and political stability.
The determinants of exchange rate regimes can be grouped into two categories: OCA
variables and others. The OCA theory was first brought up by Mundell (1961). The
paper proposes that a region in which economic e ciency is maximized by having
a single currency is an OCA. The criteria for forming an OCA are outlined by the
theory. Overall there is a trade-o↵ between reduced transaction costs among regions
and maintenance costs for operating the single currency, such as the inability to
freely conduct monetary policy. The main variables relevant to the formation of an
OCA are trade openness, economic development, capital and labour mobility. The
modern OCA theory has evolved over time and now focuses on three widely available
and testable variables: size of economy, trade openness and terms of trade volatility.
Theoretically, a lower level of real shocks, smaller economy size and higher trade
openness are associated with fixed exchange rates. At the same time, risk exposure
hypothesis suggests that countries with high trade openness are exposed to terms
of trade shocks and thus may prefer a flexible regime.
Other determinants are mostly financial or political factors. Scholars long ago linked
financial factors to the ERR choice. Savvides (1990), Edwards (1996, 1998) and
Rizzo (1998) find financial determinants like real exchange rate volatility, current
account and external debt significant. The formal idea about the financial view
emerged when Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) brought together the impossible trinity
hypothesis and exchange rate arrangements. Countries cannot manage free capital
flows, independent monetary policy and fixed exchange rates at the same time and
thus a trade-o↵ between the three should be observed in countries’ ERR choices.
Assuming that countries conducting non-hard pegs are targeting variables other
than exchange rates with their monetary policy regimes, I predict that higher level of
capital account openness is correlated with non-ERT (hard pegs) regimes. If I treat
the foreign debt to GDP ratio as a de facto measure of capital account openness,
I expect an association between high level of foreign debt to GDP ratio and free
ERR. However, Calvo and Reinhart (2002)’s fear of floating hypothesis links concern
over balance sheet and regime choice together. The currency mismatch hypothesis
suggests that countries with high liability dollarization are afraid of sudden balance
sheet deteriorations caused by depreciation and are more likely to adopt fixed ERR.
Early studies such as Poirson (2001), Berger et al. (2000) and Edwards (1996, 1998)
demonstrate that foreign reserves are a significant determinant of ERR but the direc-
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tion of e↵ects is ambiguous. However, there is no theoretical foundation to support
the association between the ERR choice and the level of reserves. The significant
correlation in previous literature is likely due to simultaneity, that couturiers operate
a fixed ERR require a high level of reserve. I omit the reserve level from determi-
nants due to the concern of simultaneity and lack of theoretical support. Given
that the level of foreign reserves is unlikely to be correlated with other explanatory
variables, I do not need to worry about the endogeneity issue caused by omitting
foreign reserve level.
Frieden et al. (2000) and Poirson (2001) find political elements strongly relevant
to ERR choice. It is anticipated that political factors would shape policymakers’
decisions including those on monetary policy. However, it is di cult to interpret
the link. The credibility view proposes that fixed exchange rates can be a policy
crutch for weak governments and helps to tame inflation. Thus we should observe
a positive correlation between political institutions and fixed exchange rates along
with a negative correlation between high inflation and fixed ERR. The consistency
view suggests that weak governments have di culties in maintaining fixed rates
as well as low inflation and would let their exchange rates float. In both groups,
political institutions and inflation conditions matter, but the expected signs on the
variables are opposite.
Cobham (2010) suggests that the development of financial markets is vital for coun-
tries’ MRP choices. Only when the transmission channel of monetary policy – the
institutional and market infrastructure – is well developed are central banks able
to conduct policies solely through interest rates and operate under frameworks like
inflation targeting. The paper provides three categories for countries’ financial and
banking system: basic, intermediate and modern. I expect that the basic type
of financial architecture is associated with exchange rate targeting regime. Hence
a high level of financial development is expected to be associated flexible exchange
rates. Table 2.1 summarises theoretical predictions of the impacts of country-specific
variables.
OCA Risk exposure Impossible trinity Currency mismatch Credibility view Consistency view Financial development
Economic size +
Trade openness   +
Terms of trade shocks +
Capital account openness +
Foreign debt asset +  
High inflation +    
Political institutions   +
Financial development +
The signs shows the association between variables and flexible ERR.
Table 2.1: Theoretical predictions of the impacts of country-specific variables
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Juhn and Mauro (2002) test two groups of variables jointly. They choose cross-
sectional data on the grounds that some variables vary little over time and variables
changing su ciently over time are more endogenous in a time series context than
in a cross section context. Both de jure (IMF) and de facto classifications (Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005)) are adopted in the study. The sample for the
baseline model includes 130 countries for the IMF classification and 75 for the LYS
classification. Only countries that did not change their regime over the period from
1990 and 2000 are selected, as the authors’ focus of interest is to find long-term
determinants. The usual latent variable tests probit and multinomial logit are
employed and there are no robustly significant determinants found.
Contrary to Juhn and Mauro (2002), Levy Yeyati et al. (2010) find OCA, financial
and political factors identified by previous researchers to be significant in subgroups
and jointly. Multinomial logits are run for an unbalanced panel data set of 183
countries over the post-Bretton Woods period from 1974 to 2004. The dependent
variables is 1 for floats, 2 for intermediates and 3 for pegs. The regime classifications
adopted are IMF, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Reinhart and Rogo↵
(2004). The paper deals with the endogeneity issue raised by Juhn and Mauro (2002)
by lagging the possible endogenous variables by one period, assuming that past
values are not directly a↵ected by current unobservable factors. Some researchers
are sceptical about this method of dealing with endogeneity (Ball and Mazumder
(2011)). Levy Yeyati et al. (2010) find that changes in ERR choices and global trends
in ERR choices are endogenous and driven by the variations of the fundamental
determinants, and those determinants are long-run determinants given that thirty
years is a long period in monetary policy studies. Though studying similar issues,
Juhn and Mauro (2002) and Levy Yeyati et al. (2010) with di↵erent econometric
methodologies come to conflicting results.
Meissner and Oomes (2009) do not simply study the determinants of ERR: the cat-
egories for their latent dependent variable are peg to the USD, peg to the Franc, peg
to the Mark, float and freely fall, based on the de facto classification of Reinhart
and Rogo↵ (2004). The multinomial logit panel model is used. For explanatory
variables, the authors control for factors that a↵ect countries’ anchor currency and
ERR choice simultaneously. Idiosyncratic determinants of anchor currency choice
are trade network externalities, which are measured by the trade-weighted number
of trade partners that peg to the same anchor, output co-movement and the currency
denomination of liabilities normalized by nominal GDP. Country-specific determi-
nants of ERR choice chosen in the paper match the earlier literature which contained
OCA and financial factors. However, political factors, other than inflation history,
which might be seen as a proxy for the central bank’s strength, are not considered in
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their main regressions. In addition, the lag of choice of regime is included as an in-
dependent variable to capture policy persistence. The baseline model uses a sample
including data from 1990 to 1998. The paper finds that within-bloc trade is crucial
and the coe cient on it is significantly positive. According to a counter-factual
analysis, the e↵ect of network externalities is strong, and thus countries could be
locked in suboptimal anchor choices. However, other determinants of anchor and
regime choice, including OCA and other factors, are only significant in some cases.
In robustness checks, a cross-sectional data of 1998 is tested as well. The results
from the panel and cross-sectional studies do not di↵er notably. Political factors are
also added in robustness checks and turn out to be insignificant. Basically, Meiss-
ner and Oomes (2009)’s results are in accordance with Juhn and Mauro (2002)’s
findings but raise the importance of network e↵ects in exchange rate policy studies.
There are other papers which include trade factors such as trade concentration in
the explanatory variables of ERR studies and authors find them significant (Dreyer
(1978); Rizzo (1998)). However, trade concentration usually measures the volume
or percentage of one country’s trade with its major trade partners, which is di↵erent
from trade within the anchor bloc, and thus cannot help to identify currency net-
work e↵ects. Table 2.2 presents the results from the three main studies considered
above.
Juhn and Mauro
(2002)
Levy Yeyati et. al
(2010)
Meissner and
Oomes (2009)
Dataset Cross-sectional
2000
Panel 1974-2004 Panel 1990-1998
Methodology Multinomial Logit Multinomial Logit Multinomial Logit
ERR Classification De jure and LYS
(1999)
LYS (1999), RR
(2004)
RR (2004)
OCA - *** -
Financial - ** -
Political - *** -
Network E↵ects / / ***
Note: - insignificant, / not relevant, * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
level, *** significant at 1% level.
Table 2.2: Comparison of studies on the determinants of ERR
There is only a limited literature on currency network e↵ects. Some research has
been done on the dollarization ratio and network externalities. Peiers and Wrase
(1997) build a model to explain the network e↵ects of countries’ dollarization ra-
tios. They propose that experiences with transactions in dollars reduce the marginal
cost of dollar-denominated borrowing and transacting. Uribe (1997) creates a sim-
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ilar model independently and also assumes that experiences in dollar-denominated
transactions a↵ect future transactions in dollars. An earlier work by Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989) implicitly proposed the idea of network externalities by suggesting
a dominant currency as a medium of exchange. Oomes (2003) develops a theoreti-
cal model with empirical estimation based on similar ideas and shows that network
e↵ects are indeed relevant to exchange rate policy.
Yehoue (2004) builds a theoretical model to examine the impacts of trade network
externalities on currency bloc formation. The paper proposes a dynamic game with
3 players (countries), and suggests that once the benefits of cost reduction overweigh
the cost of adopting a single currency (such as forgoing monetary autonomy), coun-
tries are likely to form a currency bloc. And this mechanism helps to explain the
slow expansion of currency blocs: a country is willing to join a bloc if and only if the
trade volume between the country and the existing bloc is high enough. The theo-
retical model highlights the role of network externalities in ER policy and mimics
the creation and expansion of currency blocs in history, such as the gold standard,
the CFA zone and the EMU.
As for more explicit studies on currency networks, Bleaney and Tian (2012) suggest
that the peg e↵ect operates mostly through currency networks. They find lower
bilateral volatility among countries choosing the same anchor currency and argue
that these currency network e↵ects help to o↵set the disadvantages coming with
monetary dependence. Similarly Devereux et al. (2003) compare the cases of the
euro and the USD, suggesting that currency union, an ultimate version of hard
pegs, helps the participating countries decrease exchange-rate pass-through and im-
prove resistance to exchange rate shocks. Matesanz and Ortega (2014) find there
is interdependence between countries’ exchange rate policies but they focus on ER
movements and believe this interdependence is the reason for financial crisis conta-
gion. This research is a combination of above approaches, focusing on both network
e↵ects and country-specific determinants of ERR using spatial analysis.
2.3 Methodology and Data
In the 1960s more or less all countries pegged to the USD within the Bretton Woods
international monetary system; after the system broke down in the early 1970s most
’advanced’ economies started to float, while most developing countries continued to
peg. In the 1980s and 1990s, emerging market countries started to operate managed
floats but developing countries mostly continued to peg. After the 1997 financial
crisis, some emerging economies, especially Asian countries, abandoned intermediate
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regimes and moved to fixed or flexible regimes. Levy Yeyati et al. (2010) suggest
that this trend is endogenous but some research has countered this finding. It is
possible that large swings in regime choices are caused by network e↵ects: a few
countries change their ERR and other countries follow. If this snowball e↵ect is true
for countries’ decisions, we should be able to observe spatial autocorrelations among
countries’ ERR choices.
2.3.1 Methodology
It is common to criticise economists for relying too much on fancy econometrics
which is complex and hard to interpret. Spatial econometrics, although looking
fancy with its complicated algorithms and estimation strategy, has a straightforward
intuition: it is simply trying to examine the influence of neighbouring countries. The
model I want to estimate is
y = ⇢Wy +X  + ✏ (2.1)
where y is choice of countries, ⇢ is the spatial autoregressive parameter, W is the
weighting matrix which reflects the channel of spacial impacts,   is a vector of coef-
ficients for country-specific factors, X is the matrix of country-specific factors, and
✏ is the error term. The impact of neighbours is determined by ⇢Wy. Neighbours
here can be those with geographical proximity, economic closeness or institutional
similarity. This is a natural tool to analyse the network e↵ects caused by interde-
pendence among countries’ decisions.
Time dependence is a key motivation for adopting spatial analysis (LeSage and
Pace (2008)). If countries observe and make decisions based on other countries’
past decisions, then the decisions of countries will show spatial dependence in cross-
sectional data. The data generating process will be yt = ⇢Wy(t 1) +Xt  + ✏t, with
yt being the decision outcome and ✏t being the error term at time The model has a
space-time lagged representation.
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yt = ⇢Wyt 1 +Xt  + ✏t (2.2)
yt = ⇢W (Xt 1  + ⇢Wyt 2 + ✏t 1) +X  + ✏t (2.3)
yt = (InX + ⇢WXt 1)  + ⇢2W 2(⇢Wyt 3 +Xt 2  + ✏t 2) + ✏t + ⇢W ✏t 1 (2.4)
yt = (InX + ⇢WXt 1 + ⇢2W 2Xt 2)  + ⇢3W 3(⇢Wyt 4 +Xt 3  + ✏t 3)
+ ✏t + ⇢W ✏t 1 + ⇢2W 2✏t 2 (2.5)
......
yt = (InX + ⇢WXt 1 + ⇢2W 2Xt 2 + ...+ ⇢q 1W q 1Xt q+1)  + ⇢qW qyt q + ut
(2.6)
where ut = ✏t + ⇢W ✏t 1 + ⇢2W 2✏t 2 + ...+ ⇢q 1W q 1✏t q+1
Country-specific factors such as economic size, the degree of trade openness, political
institutions and financial infrastructure do not change drastically every year. Thus
I assume that Xt is relatively fixed over a period of time, and suppress the time
denote of X in the equation. In this case, equation 2.6 can be written as equation
2.7, which can be further arranged as 2.8.
yt = (InX + ⇢WX + ⇢
2W 2X + ...+ ⇢q 1W q 1X)  + ⇢qW qyt q + ut (2.7)
yt = (In + ⇢W + ⇢
2W 2 + ...+ ⇢q 1W q 1)X  + ⇢qW qyt q + ut (2.8)
(2.9)
The error term is assumed to have a normal distribution ✏t ⇠ N(0,  2✏ ). Thus
E(✏t) = 0. I use normalised version of weighting matrix, which means that the sum
of row elements equal to 1 if not all elements are zero. If all elements in a row are
equal to zero, these elements remain zero, soW  IW . In addition, I assume |⇢| < 1.
The assumptions on ⇢ and W also make sure that I   ⇢W is positive definite and
invertible. As q becomes larger, ⇢qW q becomes smaller, and the expectation of y is
asymptotically equal to
lim
q!1
E(y) = (In   ⇢W ) 1X  (2.10)
With some iterations, I show how time dependence of decisions (space-time-lagged
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model) can have a spacial autoregressive (space-lagged) representation in the cross-
sectional setting. Hence the data generating process indicated by equation 2.10 can
be arranged as equation 2.1.
In this chapter, y is the choice of countries ERR, which is a categorical variable. It
raises further complications to the problem. The choice of ERR y reflects unobserved
utility y⇤ associated with the choice. LeSage and Pace (2009) proposes an estimation
strategy of SAR MNP model based on Bayesian MCMC and a Gibbs sampling
scheme. Let j denotes alternatives choice of ERR and number of covariates J = 3
with j = 0 being the default category. The model to estimate can be written as
yj⇤ = ⇢Wyj0 ⇤+X j + uj 8 j =1, 2, 3 (2.11)
Similar to models with continuous dependent variables, ⇢ is the spatial autoregressive
parameter, and the impact of other countries is determined by ⇢Wyj0⇤.
We need to find posterior distributions of yj⇤, ⇢,   and cross-alternative co-
variates matrix. Following LeSage and Pace (2008) and Wang et al. (2014), I
draw parameters with the following strategies. The latent dependent variable y*
with spatial autocorrelations follows a truncated multivariate normal distribution
(TMVN): y⇤ ⇠ TMV N(µ,⌦). From the iteration, I can find that the mean
µ = (In   ⇢W ) 1X  and variance-covariance matrix is ⌦. They adopt Geweke
(1991)’s method to create samples for y*. Sample size has always been a concern in
cross-sectional studies, as I have only around 150 observations to create thousands
of draws. Using the m-step Gibbs sampler for drawing y* can mitigate the problem
by creating more draws e↵ectively. As proposed by Koop (2003), the 10-step Gibbs
sampler is standard and should be adequate. I draw y⇤i from y* conditional on all
other y⇤j s where j=1,2,n but j 6= i and ys are drawn from a TMVN distribution.
As in basic spatial autoregressive (SAR) models,  s are drawn from normal dis-
tributions and ⇢ is sampled using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The matrix
⌦ measures cross-alternative covariates, and the spatial parameter is drawn from a
multivariate normal and Wishart distribution. The algorithm and code to estimate
the SAR MNP model are provided by the authors of Wang et al. (2014).
In summary, the spatial multinomial model follows the DGP: y⇤ = (In ⇢W ) 1X +
(In   ⇢W ) 1✏ and ✏ ⇠ N(0, In). Thus in order for the disturbance term to be
normally distributed, country-specific independent variables must be controlled for
and included in X. Previous studies in this area, as mentioned in the literature
review, provide guidelines for necessary controls, which will be discussed in the
next subsection. It has been shown that the magnitude and significance level of
the parameters would be notably biased when spatial autocorrelations exist but are
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being neglected (Gelman et al. (2014)). This paper will provide further evidence for
the debate about whether ERR choices are endogenous.
Fleming (2004) survey several methods to estimate spatial discrete models: Bayesian
MCMC sampling, heteroskedastic estimator, feasible generalised least squares es-
timator, and GMM estimators. Wang and Kockelman (2009), Chakir and Parent
(2009), Wang et al. (2014) and this chapter adopt Bayesian MCMC approach. Com-
paring to MCMC algorithms, other methods are advantageous in terms of showing
the consistency of estimators. However, Bayesian methods are with the medium
level of computational intensity and applicable to multinomial cases as well as rela-
tively small sample sizes. This chapter is also di↵erent from the mentioned papers as
I use a combination of frequentist and Bayesian estimation to deal with endogeneity
issues. I adopt a 2-step estimation strategy. First, I use ordinary least squares (OLS)
to regress endogenous variables including weighting matrix on instruments variables.
Second, I estimate the SAR MNP model with exogenous variables obtained from
the first step with Bayesian methods. This two-step method is an intuitively ap-
pealing empirical strategy. However, the statistical properties of such estimators are
unknown and should be the subject of future work.
Beron and Vijverberg (2004) show that using maximum likelihood (ML) to estimate
a spatial probit model involves substantial di culty and takes an unnecessarily long
time. However, Smirnov (2010) presents a persuade ML method to estimate the
spatial discrete choice model. The new method is consistent and easy to compute
and maintains analytical tractability of the concept of random utility theory. The
persuade ML estimator is equivalent to a standard ML estimator for an auxiliary
model. In the auxiliary model, individuals are fully account for the spatial e↵ect in
the observed variables, but account only for private e↵ects of spatial interdependen-
cies in the unobserved shocks in random utilities. The assumption of homogeneity
of spatial e↵ects on random utilities across alternatives indicates that spatial e↵ects
of shocks in random utilities of others have no impact on conditional choice proba-
bilities. Pinkse and Slade (1998) uses GMM to estimate a binary probit model with
spatial error correlation. Pinkse et al. (2006) proposes an one step GMM estima-
tor or continuous updating estimator of Hansen et al. (1996) to estimate dynamic
spatial discrete choice models. The estimator is proved to be consistent, asymptoti-
cally normal and e cient. But so far these methods are applicable to binary choice
models.
There is growing literature combining copula with spatial analysis. Using copula,
it is able to generate stochastic dependence relationship among variables given pre-
specified marginal distributions. Hence copula o↵ers a new way to model spatial
dependence. Bhat and Sener (2009) and Bhat et al. (2010) use copula-based dis-
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crete models for accommodating spatial correlation across observational units. Sener
and Bhat (2012) extend the copula approach to spatial multinomial data. Kazianka
(2013) further develop the method to estimate count data model with spatial de-
pendencies. It will be interesting to explore the alternative method to estimate the
spatial multinomial model as robustness checks.
The weighting matrix reflects the impact of spatial interdependence and thus the
selection of weighting matrix is of great importance. Without an appropriate weight-
ing matrix, the spatial autocorrelation would not be significant even if it exists, or
the spatial parameter might be seriously biased. In this study, I consider four alter-
native weighting matrices to examine the existence and possible channel of spatial
autocorrelation. The first choice is the geographical distance between the capitals
of countries, which is commonly used as a weighting matrix.
In economic policy studies, especially exchange rate policy, I believe that economic
distance is more relevant. Trade closeness has always been an important measure of
economic distance and is also selected as the weighting matrix. Moreover, Meissner
and Oomes (2009) find the trade volume matters for network e↵ects. Thus, based on
the early studies, the ratio of trade volume (inflow and outflow) between countries
i, j over the total trade volume of country i is chosen to be the measure of distance
from country j to i. Similarly, the distance from country i to j will be the import and
export between i and j divided by the total trade volume of country j. Though the
numerator will be the same for the weighting elements of country i to j and j to i,
the denominator will be larger in the country with more trade. Thus the weighting
matrix is asymmetric, so the influence of a small economy on a large economy will be
smaller than the impacts of a large economy on a small one, which fits the reality. If
W with economic distances identifies the spatial autocorrelation, then the bilateral
or multilateral trade between regions will be the main cause of network e↵ects.
Some studies argues that trade flow is endogenously a↵ected by a country’s exchange
rate policy (McKenzie (1999); Baldwin (2005) ). Hence I use instrumented trade
flows instead of original ones. The predicted values of trade data are from author’s
websites of Melitz and Toubal (2014). The instrument variables used are common
languages, distance, post-colonial relationships, common legal systems and religions
as well as dummy variables for years at war. Thus the estimations with trade
weighting matrix adopt a two-step mixed strategy method. The first step is done
with frequentist method (OLS) and the second step is Bayesian MCMC method.
There are other methods to deal with endogenous weighting matrix. Kelejian and
Piras (2014) uses two stage least square (2SLS) estimation to deal with endoge-
nous weighting matrix. The 2SLS estimator shows consistency and asymptotical
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normality with endogenous weighting matrix. However, the method also imposes
several high level assumptions. Qu et al. (2017) develop a Quasi maximum like-
lihood estimator to estimate the model with endogenous weighting matrix in one
step. Kuersteiner and Prucha (2015) develop a class of GMM estimators based on
linear and quadratic moment conditions and forward di↵erence data, and the estima-
tors allow for endogenous spatial weight matrices and other e↵ects. Bhattacharjee
et al. (2016)’s method based on functional data analysis can account for endogenous
weighting matrix as well. The estimation method involves partitioning the spatial
domain, constructing functional average surface and estimating functional principal
components estimator. There are increasing literature2 estimating spatial models
with unknown weighting matrix. It would be interesting to examine what kind of
information unknown weighting matrices can reveal in future studies.
I will also explore weighting matrices constructed on the basis of institutional re-
lationships. The choice of anchor currency is linked deeply with histories and in-
stitutions. Two proxies are used as there is no direct measure of the institutional
closeness between countries. An institutional weighting matrix, which is constructed
on the basis of the past colonial experience of countries, is tested. I use a dummy
variable: if two countries were colonised by the same country in the past, I put 1
in their relationship, and 0 otherwise. The linguistic factor is a reasonable proxy as
well. Countries with the same spoken, o cial or native languages are likely to have
similar histories and institutions, and their culture and political environment usu-
ally share similarities. Linguistic proximity between countries will impact the ease
of communication and doing business with each other. Melitz and Toubal (2014)
create an index of language closeness taking account of the linguistic factors men-
tioned above. And I will use this index as another proxy for institutional closeness.
The normalised versions of the matrices are used. The best fitting weighting ma-
trix is also the most likely transmission channel of network e↵ects. It is reasonable
to assume that modern ERR arrangements do not influence past colonial relation-
ships or languages, and hence we can treat the weighting matrices with institutional
relationships as exogenous.
2.3.2 Data
Following previous studies, OCA, financial and political factors are included in the
explanatory variable matrix X. I am more concerned with de facto exchange rates,
thus Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2004), in which anchor currency choices are also identified,
is used as the source for the dependent variables. The variables and their sources
2For examples: Bailey et al. (2013), Bhattacharjee and Holly (2013), Gupta and Robinson
(2015), Ahrens and Bhattacharjee (2015), Bhattacharjee and Holly (2015), Sun (2016), etc...
19
are summarised in table 2.3. There are no direct measures of countries’ capital
account openness, financial development or political institutions. Thus I use index
measure constructed in previous literature for these variables. KAopen measures
the degree of capital account openness: the higher the value, the higher the degree
of openness. The polity index shows the strength of political institutions. Financial
development is a relatively new index, providing a unified measure of the depth,
access and e ciency of countries’ financial institutions and financial markets.
Variable Name Measure Calculation Source
Logsize Economic size Log of GDP IFS
Openness Trade openness (import+export)/GDP IFS
ToTshocks Real shocks Standard deviation of the logarithm
of terms of trade
WDI series
KAopen Capital account
openness
Index measure of capital openness Chinn and Ito
(2008)
Liability Foreign liability Foreign debt assets as percentage of
GDP
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007)
Vetopoints Political weakness Extent of institutionalized con-
straints on the decision-making pow-
ers of chief executives
Polcon 2005
HighInflation Inflation history Dummy variable for countries with
inflation greater than 10% in the
past year
IFS
FD Financial develop-
ment
Index measure of financial develop-
ment
Svirydzenka (2016)
W trade Instrumented bilat-
eral trade volume
Wij = (exportsij +
exportij)/(exportj + importj)
Melitz and Toubal
(2014)
W dist Geographical dis-
tance
CEPII Database
W common
colonizer
Colonial Experience Dummy variable for countries shar-
ing a common colonizer in the his-
tory
Melitz and Toubal
(2014)
Dependent
Variable
ERR De facto regime Reinhart and Rogo↵
(2004)
Table 2.3: Data Description and Source
If countries choose their ERRs based on other countries’ decisions over a period,
countries’ ERRs will present spatial autocorrelation in a cross-sectional setting, and
thus cross-sectional data will su ce in this study. The year 2004 is chosen. 2004 is
near the end of the Great Moderation and a few years before the crisis. The large
swing of ERR choices among emerging markets after 1997 and the switch to the
euro for countries which used to peg to the mark or the franc have been completed.
In addition, data availability is superior to that for earlier periods: 156 countries
are in the sample.
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Tavlas et al. (2008) provide a survey of the classification and performance of alter-
native exchange rate systems. The survey suggests that studies on the link between
particular regimes and macroeconomic variables are conflicting. This raises the con-
cern of simultaneity in the model. Thus economic size, capital account openness
and the debt to GDP ratio are instrumented using legal tradition factors, following
Carare and Stone (2006). The measures of legal traditions include the index of law
and order (The International Country Risk Guide), the property rights index (The
Heritage Foundation) and the dummy variables indicating countries’ legal origins
(La Porta et al. (1998)). The first step estimation with instruments variable is done
with OLS. In the second stage, I replace unobservable components in the main re-
gression by the residuals of the first equation and run Bayesian estimation. The first
stage estimation I use is similar to the two-stage instrumental variable method in Qu
and Lee (2015). In Kelejian and Piras (2014), first stage estimation is only run on
non-zero elements in the weighting matrix. In Qu and Lee (2015) and my chapter,
first stage IV estimation is done with all non-diagonal elements in the weighting
matrix.
The treatment of the eurozone countries is tricky. Although I could see a currency
union as countries pegging to the same currency, the euro is floating freely. There
are several possible ways to deal with it: treating these countries as free floaters,
fixers or as a single floating unit. It is countries’ behaviour that I am interested
in, not the currency as such, so treating the eurozone as a unit is not optimal for
the study. If countries are free floaters, as we can observe, they do give up their
monetary autonomy when joining the eurozone. Thus in this study, I follow Reinhart
and Rogo↵ (2004) and treat the eurozone countries as exchange rate fixers in the
baseline model. I will show the result of treating the eurozone as a single floating
unit in robustness check.
2.4 Results
The empirical results are presented in this section. Basically all models confirm the
statistical significance of the spatial autoregressive coe cient, which validates the
use of spatial analysis. Bayesian estimations do not naturally have a standard error
for coe cients, and hence I use numerical standard error which calculates the square
root of estimated variance divided by the number of observations to examine the
statistical significance of the parameters.
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2.4.1 ERR choices
I categorise countries’ ERRs based on the coarse classification of R&R. There are
four categories: hard pegs, crawling pegs, intermediates (which include managed
floats) and free floats. Since I exclude countries without essential economic data
(output, import and export) in 2004, I only have 2 cases of free falls which do not
su ce to provide inferences and thus free fall countries are excluded from the sample.
W Trade W Dist W Common colonizer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Crawling pegs Intermediates Free floats Crawling pegs intermediates Free floats Crawling pegs intermediates Free floats
Log of GDP 0.473 -0.428 0.943** -1.115* -2.201*** -10.806*** -0.004 -0.686** -1.471
(0.390) (0.353) (0.449) (0.598) (0.709) (1.423) (0.295) (0.321) (1.050)
Trade openness 0.003 -0.002 -0.018*** -0.002 -0.009 -0.075*** 0.005 0.002 -0.026**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013)
Terms of trade shocks -0.024 -0.041 -0.153*** -0.187*** -0.204*** -1.007*** -0.014 0.003 -0.115
(0.029) (0.035) (0.050) (0.064) (0.073) (0.144) (0.022) (0.030) (0.089)
Capital account openness -1.840** -0.606 -6.934*** -3.396** -1.658 -1.841 -0.479 1.125 -1.566
(0.900) (0.895) (1.244) (1.699) (1.751) (3.514) (0.681) (0.752) (1.816)
Debt to GDP ratio 0.008 0.015* 0.041*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.239*** 0.007 0.003 0.053***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.031) (0.005) (0.006) (0.019)
High inflation 0.367 1.621*** 5.887*** 2.386** 3.851*** 12.372*** -0.231 0.706* 2.339**
(0.457) (0.483) (1.052) (0.955) (1.087) (2.057) (0.334) (0.373) (1.075)
Polity index 0.017** 0.025*** 0.016 0.058*** 0.068*** 0.014 0.009* 0.022** -0.016
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.005) (0.010) (0.017)
Financial development -0.327 3.871*** 17.726*** -0.693 4.699** 24.524*** -2.598** 0.616 7.098*
(1.214) (1.320) (2.758) (1.858) (2.207) (3.181) (1.053) (1.102) (3.755)
⇢ 0.529*** 0.687*** 0.415**
(0.128) (0.066) (0.194)
Log likelihood -591.949 -615.566 -2201.115
No. of Draws 8,000
No. of burn-ins 4,000
No. of observations 156
Note: The base category is hard pegs. The numerical standard error are reported in the brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
Table 2.4: Determinants of ERR choices
Table 2.4 presents the results of using the SAR MNP model to estimate countries’
ERR choices. The second to fourth columns displays results with the trade weighting
matrix. The spatial autoregressive coe cient is 0.529 with a standard deviation
of 0.128. The spatial parameter is significant both statistically and economically.
Several country-specific factors also play a significant role in determining countries’
ERR. With hard pegs as the base category, countries with a lower level of capital
account openness and a higher level of the polity index are more likely to adopt
crawling pegs. Country-specific factors provide little information as to why countries
adopt crawling pegs instead of hard ones. Countries with a high level of the debt
to GDP ratio, inflation, level of the polity index and financial development are
more likely to adopt intermediate ERR. Economic size, the debt to GDP ratio, high
inflation and financial development are positively and significantly correlated with
operating free floats, while trade openness, terms of trade shocks and capital account
openness are negatively and significantly correlated with free floats.
The results partially meet the predictions from the OCA theories: large economies
and countries with high trade openness are more likely to operate free floats. The
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signs on ToT shocks are inconsistent with the OCA prediction. The signs on trade
openness are in accordance with the predictions from the OCA theory rather than
the risk exposure hypothesis. The impossible trinity hypothesis is rejected given that
with hard pegs as the default category, parameters on capital account openness are
positive for crawling peg and intermediate ERR. Though the sign on capital account
openness for free floats is negative as predicted, the parameter is insignificant. The
signs on the coe cients of debt to GDP ratio are negative, though only significant for
crawling pegs, which suggests that the parameters support the currency mismatch
rather than impossible trinity hypothesis. Countries with a high level of the foreign
debt to GDP ratio are more likely to adopt hard pegs to avoid sudden deterioration
of their balance sheets caused by sharp currency depreciation. The signs on high
inflation and the polity index for crawling pegs support the consistency view. Weak
governments have di culty in maintaining low inflation and operating a fixed ER
at the same time, and thus would let their exchange rates float. The signs on high
inflation and the polity index for free floats are opposite to the signs for crawling
pegs, and support the credibility view. Countries with weak political institutions
are more likely to use fixed ERR as a ‘crutch’ to tame inflation. The signs on
these two variables for intermediate ERR support neither the credibility nor the
consistency view. The signs on financial development meet my prediction that
although exchange rate targeting can be done with a basic financial architecture,
other arrangements require more sophisticated financial development.
The columns five, six and seven in table 2.4 shows the results with the weighting
matrix constructed with geographical distance. The spatial autoregressive coe cient
is statistically and economically significant. The coe cients on control variables are
with same signs and similar level of signiciance expect for economic size. Contrary
to the previous results and the OCA theory, countries with large economic size are
more likely to adopt a fixed ERR instead of other arrangements.
The last three columns of table 2.4 displays results with the past colonial relation-
ships as the weighting matrix. The spatial autoregressive coe cient is 0.415 and sig-
nificant, suggesting that countries tend to follow the ERR choice of another country
if they share a common coloniser in history. The high significance of the weighting
matrix constructed with the past colonial relationships is a strong evidence indicat-
ing that countries’ ERR choices could be path dependent. Several parameters on
idiosyncratic factors are di↵erent from results with trade or geographical weighting
matrix. However, those variables, though with opposite signs, are insignificant.
The spatial autoregressive coe cient is insignificant if I use the weighting matrix
constructed with linguistic factors. Moreover, all parameters on country-specific
factors are insignificant. Thus the model with linguistic weighting matrix is mis-
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specified and results with the linguistic weighting matrix are not reported.
The results with the trade weighting matrix are the one with the lowest log likeli-
hood, suggesting that it better reflects the transmission channel of network e↵ects.
Countries are likely to follow the ERR choice of their major trade partners. In terms
of country-specific factors, the predictions from theories are only partially met.
2.4.2 Anchor currency choice
In this section, instead of classifying countries with fixed exchange rates based on
the degree of peg ( hard or crawling), I categorise these countries according to the
anchor currency they choose. Hence the dependent variable is 0 for pegging to the
USD, 1 for pegging to the euro, 2 for intermediates and 3 for free floats.
W Trade W dist W common colonizer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Pegging to the euro Intermediates Free foats Crawling pegs Intermediates Free foats Pegging to the euro Intermediates Free foats
Log of GDP -0.097 -0.823** -0.089 -0.335 -1.762 -9.481* -0.122 -0.840** -1.491**
(0.342) (0.328) (0.644) (1.085) (1.193) (4.975) (0.369) (0.337) (0.639)
Trade openness -0.009** -0.007** -0.017*** -0.014 -0.010 -0.065** 0.001 0.001 -0.020**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.032) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010)
Terms of trade shocks 0.009 -0.021 -0.119** 0.057 0.058 -0.637** 0.065** 0.023 -0.068
(0.025) (0.028) (0.058) (0.057) (0.069) (0.272) (0.030) (0.029) (0.067)
Capital account openness 1.216* 1.546** -2.009 5.114 5.475 2.069 2.618*** 2.279*** 0.549
(0.737) (0.769) (2.740) (3.457) (3.464) (3.622) (0.938) (0.832) (1.275)
Debt to GDP ratio -0.014* -0.001 0.015 -0.074** -0.042 0.133** -0.020*** -0.003 0.034**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.036) (0.032) (0.058) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014)
High inflation -0.794* 1.009** 2.828 -2.579 1.286 8.119*** -1.482** 0.419 0.661
(0.436) (0.400) (1.908) (1.761) (0.817) (2.496) (0.598) (0.364) (0.691)
Polity index 0.003 0.011** 0.003 0.017 0.055 -0.005 -0.005 0.013* -0.014
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.018) (0.038) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Financial development 3.866*** 5.811*** 11.999*** 9.349 12.032 34.663*** -0.608 0.864 2.549
(1.388) (1.273) (4.549) (7.732) (8.040) (12.441) (1.145) (1.095) (2.792)
⇢ 0.303 0.527* 0.655***
(0.215) (0.279) (0.075)
Log likelihood -824.163 -677.666 -408.494
No. of Draws 8,000
No. of burn-ins 4,000
No. of observations 156
Note: The base category is pegging to the USD. The numerical standard error are reported in the brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2.5: Determinants of ERR and anchor currency choices
In table 2.5, three groups of results with di↵erent weighting matrices (trade volume,
geographical distance, and past colonial relationships) are presented. The spatial
autocorrelation here suggests not only that countries’ choice of the regime is a↵ected
by the neighbours, but so is their choice of anchor. Thus countries would seem to
follow their neighbours’ choice of the anchor, whether it’s their geographical or their
colonial neighbours.
Columns two to four display the results with the trade weighting matrix. The spatial
autoregressive coe cient is insignificant and thus the model is misspecified. Hence
I do not discuss these results in detail.
Meissner and Oomes (2009) suggests that trade reflect the network e↵ects of coun-
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tries’ ERR. It is unexpected that trade weighting matrix is of less importance in
table 2.5. I stress that I use instrumented trade data to construct trade weight-
ing matrix, and assuming that trade relationship influence countries’ ERR choices
through instruments only, which are common languages, distance, post-colonial re-
lationships, common legal systems and religions as well as dummy variables for years
at war. Hence the prevalent correlations between trade and ERR might be due to
reverse causality or channels di↵erent from instruments I mentioned. Given that
instrumental variables cover many institutional channels of influence, I think the
reverse causality is a more important reason for high correlation between trade and
ERR and anchor currency choices in previous studies.
Columns five to seven display the results with the weighting matrix constructed
with geographic distance. With both anchor currency and ERR choice as dependent
variables, the spatial autoregressive coe cient is 0.527 and significant, suggesting
that countries are likely to follow the anchor currency choice of their geographical
neighbours. Not many country-specific variables are significant. Countries with a
lower level of foreign debt to GDP ratio are more likely to peg to the euro instead of
the USD. The idiosyncratic variables provide no information why countries choose
intermediate ERR instead of pegging to the USD. The parameter on idiosyncratic
variables for free floats have the same signs and similar significance level with results
in table 2.4. Contrary to the OCA predictions, small economies with low real shocks
are likely to choose free floats. The signs on trade openness fits the expectation. The
impossible trinity hypothesis is contradicted though the coe cient is insignificant.
The parameters on debt to GDP ratio, high inflation, the polity index and financial
development fit the currency mismatch hypothesis, credibility view and financial
development view. However, the sign on the polity index is insignificant.
The last three columns of table 2.5 show the results with the past colonial relations as
the weighting matrix. The spatial coe cient is 0.655 and significant. The signs of the
parameters on control variables are basically the same as the results with distance as
the weighting matrix, but significance level of the parameter are di↵erent. Countries
with high real shocks, high level of capital account openness, low level of foreign debt
to GDP ratio and low inflation are more likely to peg to the euro instead of the USD.
Countries with small economic size, high level of capital account openness and high
level of the polity index have a higher likelihood to operate intermediate ERR. The
signs of parameters for free floats are the same as using distance as weighting matrix,
but coe cients on ToT shocks, capital account openness, high inflation and financial
development are insignificance.
The model with the past colonial relationships as the weighting matrix is the one
with the lowest log likelihood, suggesting that countries’ anchor currency and ERR
25
choice are more likely to be path dependent. There are countries that are not
geographically nor economically close to Europe (US) pegging to the euro (USD)
for historical reasons.
By running SAR MNL model, it is assumed that countries make the choice of ERR
and anchor currency simultaneously. However, it is possible that countries’ ERR
and anchor currency is a two-step choice. If it is true, then a multilevel model,
estimating why countries peg or float first and then estimate why countries with
fixed ERR choose a particular anchor currency, will be more appropriate. Since this
study estimates SAR model in a cross sectional setting with country level data, a
multilevel model would further restrain the sample size in the second step. This
study does not provide a multilevel analysis given the restriction, but it will be
interesting to see how this influences results in further researches.
As in the study of countries’ ERR choices, the spatial autoregressive coe cients and
the parameters on idiosyncratic factors are insignificant if the linguistic weighting
matrix is used, and hence results are not reported. Though common language and
language proximity play a role in countries’ political culture and policy-making,
countries do not seem to follow the anchor currency or ERR choice of countries
that they share similar or common languages with. However, language proximity is
expected to be influenced by the past colonial relationships. It is interesting that the
weighting matrix with language factors is insignificant, while the weighting matrix
with past colonial relationship is. It is worth noting that I use if countries share
a common coloniser in the past in the matrix instead of all colonial relationships.
Hence the impacts between coloniser and the colonised are neglected. Seeing that
many coloniser’s languages are now o cial or common language in colonial countries,
the language weighting matrix indicates that colonisers’ ERR choices have impacts
on colonial countries and colonial countries’ ERR influence colonisers’ as well. The
assumptions imposed by language weighting matrix are too many and too strong.
For instance, Hong Kong, Bahrain and the Bahamas share a common coloniser in
the past, and are now pegging to the Dollar. Hence unlike the weighting matrix
constructed with data if countries share a common coloniser in the past, language
weighting matrix does not seem to reflect the influence of ERR choices.
2.4.3 Robustness and treatment of the eurozone
The dollar-euro exchange rate is the most influential exchange rate in the market.
Both currencies are freely floating. In this section, the eurozone is treated as one
unit with a floating exchange rate regime as a robustness check. Since I believe that
currency network e↵ects are key determinants of exchange rate regimes, treating the
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eurozone as one single unit should not change the significance level of the spatial au-
toregressive coe cient. However, the parameters for country-specific determinants
might be di↵erent.
As a robustness check, I use the weighting matrix that has the lowest log likelihood
in the main results. The results are presented in table 2.6, with columns two to
four displaying results with countries’ ERR as dependent variable and the trade
weighting matrix, and columns five to seven showing results with countries’ anchor
currency choice and ERR as dependent variables and the past colonial relationships
as the weighting matrix. As predicted, the spatial autocorrelation between countries’
choices remains significant but some parameters on the explanatory variables are
di↵erent from previous models.
ERR choices ERR and anchor currency choices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Crawling Pegs Intermediates Free floats Peg to the Euro Intermediates Free floats
Log of GDP 0.170 -0.506 1.131** -0.293 -0.775** -0.050
(0.296) (0.379) (0.535) (0.396) (0.327) (0.353)
Trade openness -0.000 -0.007* -0.015*** 0.003 0.001 -0.012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008)
Terms of trade shocks -0.024 -0.021 -0.094** 0.084*** 0.025 -0.047
(0.022) (0.028) (0.041) (0.032) (0.030) (0.055)
Capital account openness -0.839 0.891 -3.349*** 2.998*** 2.224*** -1.428
(0.656) (0.842) (1.222) (1.019) (0.855) (1.281)
Debt to GDP ratio 0.004 -0.003 0.007 -0.011 -0.005 0.019*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011)
High inflation -0.114 1.069*** 1.409** -1.215** 0.409 0.509
(0.321) (0.382) (0.564) (0.558) (0.359) (0.646)
Polity index 0.011** 0.018*** -0.000 -0.006 0.012 -0.014
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
Financial development 0.519 5.989*** 7.938*** -4.580** 1.340 2.413
(1.178) (1.365) (1.869) (1.810) (1.206) (2.521)
⇢ 0.096* 0.655***
(0.057) (0.103)
Log likelihood -315.667 -803.824
No. of Draws 8,000
No. of burn-ins 4,000
No. of observations 146
Note: The base category is hard pegs and pegging to the USD for the left and right regression respectively. The
numerical standard error are reported in the brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2.6: The eurozone
The spatial autoregressive coe cient for the ERR choice study with trade weighting
matrix is statistically significant at the 90% level but with little economic significance
given that the value is small. It suggests that if I treat the eurozone as a single
floating unit, the likelihood that countries follow the ERR choice of their major
trade partners is small. However, several country-specific factors remain significant.
There are few di↵erences between the main results and robustness check. The signs
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of the parameters are mostly in accordance with the main results. The signs of the
coe cients on trade openness for crawling pegs and on financial development for
crawling pegs and free floats are di↵erent, but insignificant in the main results and
robustness test. The coe cients on capital account openness for crawling pegs and
on debt to GDP ratio for free floats are insignificant in the robustness check. Trade
openness is significant in the robustness test.
In the robustness check, with pegging to the USD as the base category, country-
specific factors in addition to network e↵ects determine countries’ anchor currency
and ERR choices. The spatial autoregressive coe cients remain statistically and
economically significant. There are several di↵erences in the parameters on id-
iosyncratic factors. Economic size is negatively and insignificantly correlated with
operating free floats in the robustness test, but it is significant in the main regres-
sion. Given that now I categorise the eurozone as one unit with floating ERR, the
negative association between economic size and free floats should not be significant.
Similarly, if I treat the eurozone as on single floating unit, the negative correlation
between trade openness and free floats is no longer significant. The sign of the coef-
ficient on capital account openness for free floats is positive in the main regression
and negative in the robustness test, but the coe cients are insignificant in both
cases. The coe cients on the polity index for intermediates are positive in the main
models and robustness test, but insignificant in robustness test. The significance
level and signs of other coe cients are the same in the main models and robustness
test.
2.4.4 Summary of results
The spatial autocorrelation coe cients in the above models vary between 0.096 and
0.687 and are mostly significant at the 99% level, suggesting that the spatial depen-
dence is positive and strong. Compared to other channels, trade better reflects the
impact of spatial interdependence for countries’ ERR choices and past colonial rela-
tionships better reflect the network e↵ects for countries’ ERR and anchor currency
choices.
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ERR choices ERR and anchor currency choices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crawling pegs Intermediate Free floats Peg to the euro Intermediate Free floats
OCA Log of GDP        
Trade openness  ⇤⇤  
Terms of trade shocks   +  
Financial Capital account openness     + +
Debt to GDP ratio + +  ⇤   +
Financial development + +⇤ + +
Political High inflation +⇤ +⇤⇤   + +
Polity index +⇤ +⇤⇤ +
The least significant results among di↵erent groups are reported, and inconsistent results are not reported. The default category
is hard pegs for ERR choices, and peg to the USD for ERR and anchor currency choices. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2.7: Summary of results for idiosyncratic factors
Table 2.7 summarises the association between idiosyncratic factors and ERR choice.
For clarity, only consistent results are reported. The coe cients of country-specific
factors are sensitive to changes in model specification and weighting matrix selection.
Few coe cients are consistently robust for all model specifications. Overall the signs
of the parameters support the OCA theory in terms of trade openness, the currency
mismatch hypothesis in terms of the foreign debt to GDP ratio, and Cobham (2010)’s
theory in terms of financial development. Country-specific factors provide more
information for countries’ ERR choices than for countries’ ERR and anchor currency
choices seeing that fewer control variables are consistently significant in column 6
to 8 of table 2.7.
2.5 Conclusion
The main conclusion of this paper is twofold. First, it shows that currency network
e↵ects are strong: countries are likely to follow the ERR choices of their major trade
partners; and countries are likely to follow the anchor currency and ERR choices
of other countries if they have had a common coloniser in the past. Second, I re-
examine the country-specific determinants proposed by earlier studies and find some
of them significant, suggesting that the country’s choice of ERR is made under the
influences of both other countries and idiosyncratic factors.
From this research I can also see how sensitive the results are to methodology and
data selection in ERR studies. It is similar to the findings in the previous studies
that fail to come up with conclusive evidence which would allow us to be sure about
the positive determinants of countries’ ERR. In addition, the results of this study
are still limited by data availability so I cannot include more countries in the sample.
As currency network e↵ects are strong, countries would face multiple equilibria which
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may lead to path dependence along with coordination failure, and thus are highly
likely to be locked in suboptimal equilibria as demonstrated in Meissner and Oomes
(2009)’s game theory model. In most multi-equilibria games, players may end up in a
bad equilibrium but could improve their utilities by all moving to a good equilibrium
together. Countries might be better o↵ switching to a di↵erent anchor simultane-
ously, but no country has an incentive to switch on its own. This might explain some
of the facts described in Quah and Crowley (2012) and Stockman (1999). Most east
Asian countries peg to the USD, though they do not necessarily trade more with
the USA. The intra-east-Asia trade is of higher importance, but a large volume of
intra-Asia trade is denominated in the USD. Their study suggests that the Renminbi
and the Yen should have played a larger role in southeast Asian countries. For the
future, the study implies that the Renminbi could be a more suitable anchor for east
Asian countries in the light of the expanding economic influence of China, but they
found no trend of switching. At the same time, with economic development and
political reforms, many southeast Asian countries have better political institutions
and financial infrastructure, making them ready to pursue free exchange rates and
independent monetary policy in the future. However, if any country switches to free
floats on its own, it will face disadvantages in global markets. Overall the findings
on currency network e↵ects indicate that countries, especially small open economies
and emerging markets that fix their exchange rates, can achieve higher welfare by
escaping the suboptimal equilibrium and jointly choosing their ERRs with their
major partners through cooperation and negotiation.
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2.6 Appendix
Albania Dominica Kazakhstan Poland
United Arab Emirates Denmark Kenya Portugal
Argentina Dominican Republic Kyrgyzstan Paraguay
Armenia Algeria Cambodia Qatar
Antigua and Barbuda Ecuador Saint Kitts and Nevis Russian Federation
Australia Egypt Republic of Korea Rwanda
Austria Eritrea Kuwait Saudi Arabia
Azerbaijan Spain Lebanon Sudan
Burundi Estonia Liberia Senegal
Benin Finland Saint Lucia Singapore
Burkina Faso Fiji Sri Lanka Solomon Islands
Bangladesh France Lithuania Sierra Leone
Bulgaria Micronesia Latvia El Salvador
Bahrain Gabon Morocco Sao Tome and Principe
The Bahamas United Kingdom Republic of Moldova Suriname
Bosnia and Herzegovina Georgia Madagascar Slovakia
Belarus Ghana Mexico Slovenia
Belgium and Luxembourg Guinea Marshall Islands Sweden
Belize The Gambia Mali Seychelles
Bolivia Guinea-Bissau Malta Chad
Brazil Greece Mozambique Togo
Barbados Grenada Mauritania Thailand
Brunei Darussalam Guatemala Mauritius Tajikistan
Central African Republic Guyana Malawi Tonga
Canada Hong Kong Malaysia Trinidad and Tobago
Switzerland Honduras Niger Tunisia
Chile Croatia Nigeria Turkey
China Haiti Nicaragua Uganda
Cte d’Ivoire Hungary Netherlands Ukraine
Cameroon Indonesia Norway Uruguay
Congo India Nepal United States of America
Colombia Ireland New Zealand Uzbekistan
Comoros Iran Oman St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Cabe Verde Iceland Pakistan Venezuela
Costa Rica Israel Panama Viet Nam
Cyprus Italy Peru Vanuatu
Czech Republic Jamaica Philippines Yemen
Germany Jordan Palau South Africa
Djibouti Japan Papua New Guinea Zambia
Table 2.8: List of countries of Chapter 2
31
Figure 2.5: Trace plot of Parameters in SAR MNP Model with trade weighting
matrix and hard pegs as the the base category for countries’ ERR choices
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Figure 2.6: Trace plot of Parameters in SAR MNP Model with trade weighting
matrix and peg to the USD as the base category for countries’ ERR and anchor
currency choices
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Figure 2.7: Trace plot of Parameters in SAR MNP Model with geographical weight-
ing matrix and hard pegs as the the base category for countries’ ERR choices
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Figure 2.8: Trace plot of Parameters in SAR MNP Model with geographical weight-
ing matrix and peg to the USD as the base category for countries’ ERR and anchor
currency choices
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Figure 2.9: Trace plot of Parameters in SAR MNP Model with colonial experience
as the weighting matrix and hard pegs as the the base category for countries’ ERR
choices
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Figure 2.10: Trace plot of Parameters in SAR MNP Model with colonial experience
as the weighting matrix and peg to the USD as the base category for countries’ ERR
and anchor currency choices
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Figure 2.11: Trace plot of Parameters in SAR MNP Model with trade weighting
matrix and hard pegs as the the base category for countries’ ERR choices - Treating
eurozone countries as one economy with floating ERR
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Figure 2.12: Trace plot of Parameters in SAR MNP Model with colonial experience
as the weighting matrix and peg to the USD as the base category for countries’
ERR and anchor currency choices - Treating eurozone countries as one economy
with floating ERR
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CHAPTER 3 – DETERMINANTS OF COUNTRIES’
MONETARY POLICY REGIME
CHOICES: EVIDENCE FROM ORIGI-
NAL OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES
3.1 Introduction
The world entered a “brave new world” after Bretton Woods where countries could
choose their monetary policy regime (MPR) freely. As stated by the central banks,
for most countries, the ultimate goal of monetary policy is now to maintain price
stability, which means ensuring low inflation.
The Bank’s monetary policy objective is to deliver price stability low
inflation and, subject to that, to support the Government’s economic
objectives including those for growth and employment. Price stability is
defined by the Government’s inflation target of 2%. – Bank of England
2014
The Congress established the statutory objectives for monetary policy–
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest
rates–in the Federal Reserve Act. The FOMC noted in its statement
that the Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent (as
measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consump-
tion expenditures, or PCE) is most consistent over the longer run with
the Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate. – Federal Reserve 2014
One of the main objectives of Danmarks Nationalbank is to ensure stable
prices, i.e. low inflation. This is achieved through the monetary and
exchange rate policy. Since the early 1980s, monetary policy has been
aimed at keeping the exchange rate of the krone stable, initially against
the German D-mark and then against the euro. As the monetary policy
target of the euro area is to keep inflation below, but close to 2 percent in
the medium term, the fixed-exchange-rate policy provides a framework
for low inflation in Denmark. – Denmarks Nationalbank 2014
Some countries target inflation directly and some target other factors to control it.
There are three formal MPRs since Bretton Woods: exchange rate targeting (ERT),
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monetary targeting (MT) and inflation targeting (IT). If a countries’ monetary pol-
icy framework does not have an explicit target, I categorise them as discretionary
framework. Why do countries target the particular variables they target? This pa-
per aims to answer this question by studying the determinants of countries’ MPR
choices. Examining the determinants of advanced economies may provide further
guidelines for other countries when choosing an MPR.
As far as I know, this paper is the first paper explicitly studying the determinants
of countries MPR’ choices. Previous studies mainly focus on the determinants of
exchange rate regime (EER) and find conflicting results for the determinants, how-
ever, most studies find the OCA factors and financial development relevant for the
choice. Carare and Stone (2006) study the determinants of adopting an inflation
targeting regime and find that per capita GDP and stock market capitalisation are
significant determinants in a cross-sectional setting. The results do not contradict
their findings and suggest that economic size, trade openness, historical inflation,
financial development and political environment all have a role in determining the
MPR.
The chronology of countries’ MPRs and model specifications are presented in section
3.2. In section 3.3, I examine the potential determinants outlined in the literature
from a theoretical perspective and list the hypothesis as well as data sources. I
will present the empirical results and robustness tests in section 3.4 followed by
concluding remarks.
3.2 Model and classification of MPRs
3.2.1 Econometric model
I study the determinants of countries’ MPR in the post-Bretton Woods period (1980
to 2012). Countries that are already OECD members are included in the sample
and I call them original OECD member countries. I want to estimate
yit = x
0
it  + ✏it. (3.1)
Here y is countries’ MPR regime choices which could be ERT, MT, IT and D. ERT
and D are only categories that exist in the whole sample period, however D in
the 1980s is di↵erent from D in 2000s. Thus I set default/base category as ERT.
Given the discrete nature of countries’ MPR, the equation 3.1 can not be estimated
directly.
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From random utility model, the choice of countries’ MPR y reflects the unobservable
utility y⇤ associated with the choice. I adopt multinomial logit model (MNL) for
estimation. The MNL model imposes the independence of irrelevant alternatives
property. There are methods such as multinomial probit, generalised extreme value
and heteroscedastic extreme value relax this restriction and might be explored in
future studies.
With MNL model, it is assumed that log-odds of each MPR choice follow a linear
model
yit⇤ = log⇡jit
⇡0it
+ xit j (3.2)
with t = 1980, 1981...2012, i ⇢ {early OECD member countries}, x are potential
determinants,   are coe cients associated with determinants and y ⇢ {ERT, MT,
IT, D} is the country’s MPR choice. Subcript j denotes alternatives of discrete
choices. One of the MPR choice will be the default category 0, and j ⇢ {0, 1...J}
with J = 3. ⇡jit is the conditional probability of country i at time t to choose
alternative j and ⇡0it is the probability of choosing the default category. Thus
⇡jit =
exp(x0it j)PJ
k=1 exp(x
0
it k) + 1
. (3.3)
Let N be the totol number of observations. The corresponding log likelihood function
for maximum likelihood estimation is
log(L) =
NX
it=1
JX
j=0
exp(x0it j)PJ
k=1 exp(x
0
it k) + 1
. (3.4)
The MNL model finds coe cients that maximise the log likelihood. However, coef-
ficients here do not directly reflect how variables change the marginal probability of
adopting a certain regime. To obtain the marginal e↵ects of MNL model, we need
predictions from a fit model at fixed values of some covariates and integrating over
the remaining covariates. The marginal e↵ects of the explanatory variable l for j-th
alternative can be calculated from 3.5.
d⇡jit
dxlit
= ⇡jit( jl  
X
q
(⇡qit qj) (3.5)
where q represents all explanatory variables expect for l. I use two methods to
show the economic significance of the idiosyncratic factors. First I estimate the
marginal e↵ects for each observation and reports the average marginal e↵ects. It is
also possible to calculate the standard errors of the marginal e↵ects. Alternatively,
I plot predictive margins at each value of explanatory variables instead of averaging
them. Both methods give a similar conclusion about the economic significance of
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explanatory variables.
3.2.2 Classification of early OECD member countries’ MPR
I am interested in the de jure choice and thus countries’ own classification of their
regime choice is the main source of this study. The Bank of England sent a survey
to central banks, and one question asks whether they have adopted explicit targets.
Nighty-three central banks responded to the survey and a majority of the countries
in the sample responded. It is hard to track down the words of central banks in the
1970s or 1980s. Thus this survey provides valuable data for this study. Subsequently,
for accuracy, my definition of the categories follows the BoE survey closely.
The definition of formal IT is straightforward: a central bank announces an explicit
target for inflation rates, usually for the medium term. Some central banks have
point targets, and some have a range target. Money targeting includes all targets
on money aggregates and credit. If a country is categorised as exchange rate (ER)
targeter by themselves or by IMF’s “Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange” on that year, then their MPRs are categorised as ERT. IMF classification
would have sent strong messages to the public that they are targeting exchange rates.
For ERT countries, which adopt no separate legal tender, are in a monetary union,
have pre-announced pegs and have de facto pegs according to IMF are all included.
Some central banks were operating without an explicit target during some period in
their history, and those countries have discretionary monetary policy framework.
There are periods when some central banks have dual targets. Though in theory
countries have trade-o↵s between capital account openness, fixed exchange rates and
monetary autonomy, Italy, France, Finland and Spain did have two explicit goals in
certain periods: Italy and France were targeting both money and exchange rates in
certain periods from the 1980s until 1998; Finland and Spain were conducting IT
and ERT at the same time during the mid-1990s. In the time of dual targets, they
were in the European Monetary System (EMS) and thus were required to watch
over their exchange rates and stay within the band against the ECU. I assume that
the Tinbergen rule holds, and thus central banks can only target one variable at
a time. I use Ilzetzki et al. (2011) as additional reference, categorising countries
as ERT if they have a de facto peg and MT or IT if not. Though this procedure
contradicts my aim to classify countries’ MPRs based on de jure announcements, it
is a necessary treatment if I want to identify one intermediate target for each period.
In addition, I include the MPR choice of the eurozone. Thus I have an unbalanced
panel given that the eurozone was created in 1999. Eurozone countries are considered
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individually as ERT after 1999 and the eurozone itself as D in the main regression.
OECD economic surveys of countries were the main source for countries that did
not reply to the Bank of England survey. Presentations and studies on individual
countries such as Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Mishkin (2001), Gumundsson and
Kristinsson (1997), Berg and Gro¨ttheim (1997), Sullivan (2013) and Nascimento
(2005) are referred to when there are conflicts in the main sources. The detailed list
of countries’ MPRs is in the appendix with the sources of data.
Basically the principle and source of classification can be summarised as:
• If a country claims to have a target in the BoE survey or the OECD economic
survey, then the country is a formal targeter of that instrument.
• If the IMF classifies a country as an exchange rates targeter and the country
does not claim to have any other explicit target, then the country is classified
as an ERTer.
• If a country have two targets at the same time and ER is one of the targets,
then I use the R&R de facto ERR classification as an additional references. If
a country is a de facto ER targeter in R&R, then I classify that country as
ER targeter, and if not I classify it as the targeter of the other instrument.
The next subsection goes through countries’ MPRs in turn, and a detailed list is in
the appendix with the data sources.
The classification of countries’ MPRs on the early part of the period is di cult
since the conduct of monetary policy was more opaque and it is hard to track down
the words of governments in the 1970s and 1980s. However, by combining multiple
sources, I provide a chronology of MPRs for early OECD member countries in the
appendix.
Figure 3.1 shows the transition in the MPRs of early OECD countries. IT starts
from 1989: the first IT country was New Zealand. In 1999, Germany joined the
eurozone and ended the last case of MT. Among early OECD members, the most
prevalent MPR choices are ERT and D, and the regimes that exit throughout the
period are ERT and D. Since discretionary framework in early part of the period is
di↵erent from it in late part, I use ERT as the default category in the regression.
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Figure 3.1: MPR of Early OECD members
Australia and New Zealand
After Bretton Woods, Australia had discretionary monetary policies until 1975.
From 1976 to 1985, Australia conducted monetary policy based on ‘conditional pro-
jections’ for the M3 growth rate, and is thus categorised as MT. In the meanwhile
New Zealand pegged to the Australian dollar. Australia adopted a discretionary
framework from 1986 due to the turbulent economic circumstances. New Zealand
gave up pegging to the Australian dollar in 1985 and chose an discretionary frame-
work as well. In 1989, New Zealand became the first country to adopt IT, and
Australia followed in 1993.
United States and Canada
The patterns of MPR choice for the United States and Canada are similar: they
adopted MT soon after Bretton Woods, switched to discretionary frameworks in the
early 1980s and then became inflation targeters.
Canada in order to control its inflation problem started a monetary gradualism
programme in 1975. During the programme, the target range of MT growth rate
was reduced gradually. However, the programme was abandoned in 1982 due to
the uncertainty about M1. After that, Canada followed a discretionary monetary
framework with intermediate exchange rates. In 1991, IT was o cially adopted as
the MPR in Canada. Canada did not recognise the monetary gradualism period as
o cial MT regime in the BoE survey, but I categorise this period as MT since the
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target was set and announced even though not rigidly followed.
The United States kept to MT for a longer period, from 1974 to 1987. In response to
the concern that monetary aggregates would no longer be a useful guide for monetary
policy, the Fed abandoned its M1 target in 1987. For a very long period, from 1988 to
2011, the United States followed a ”learning by doing” strategy without an explicit
intermediate target (Garrison (2009)). I categorise this period as a discretionary
framework rather than IT since no clear target was announced for inflation rates.
The Federal Reserve did not take an o cial position on attempts to make price
stability the sole objective of monetary policy until 2012.
Economic and Monetary Union
Among 23 early OECD countries, 11 of them joined the European Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 and Greece became the twelfth eurozone country
in 2001. The European Central Bank (ECB), is responsible for making monetary
policy instead of the central banks of participating countries.
Most countries now in EMU were ERT in their earlier years. Austria, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Netherlands pegged to the Deutsche Mark (DM) after Bretton
Woods and joined the euro in 1999. Ireland pgged to the Pound before 1979, and
pegged to the DM and joined the euro in 1999. Germany targeted money from 1974
to 1998: it is the longest and one of the most successful MTers (Mishkin (2001)) in
history. Greece targeted money until 1994 and changed to ERT before joining the
eurozone.
Spain did not have an explicit target before 1989, adopted an ERT in 1989 and then
an IT in 1994 without forgoing its ERT. In 1999, Spain joined the eurozone. Finland
targeted exchange rates before entering the eurozone, but from 1993 to 1998 it had
an inflation target as well. Rose (2007) suggests that inflation targeting is a stable
regime: countries are unlikely to be forced out of this regime. Since the birth of IT,
in nearly two decades, only Finland, Spain and Slovakia have quit the regime, but
they only exited IT to join the EMU which is D.
France, Italy and Portugal had discretionary policy frameworks in the mid-1970s.
Portugal adopted an ERT in 1978 and kept it until 1999, however in 1991 and 1992
it targeted money to help control inflation and to avoid overshooting capital inflows
(OECD Economic Survey 1992). France began an MT after 1977 though it also had
an ERT in the 1980s. Italy began targeting money in 1979. It was targeting both
money and exchange rates from 1984 to 1998 except for the the period that Italy
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was out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Italy dropped out of
the ERM temporally at the end of 1992 and moved back in late 1996. France, Italy
and Portugal joined the eurozone in 1999.
Other European countries
Denmark has had an explicit target – an ERT– since 1972 and has kept that policy
until today. Norway had similar arrangements before 1994. After the oil price shock
in the early 1990s, Norway gave up its ERT seeing it a too costly for the government
to directly intervene in the exchange market. In 2001, Norway formally adopted the
IT regime. Sweden had an ERT and then switched to an IT in 1993 after the Swedish
recession.
Switzerland targeted money from 1974 but had a structural change in monetary
policy in 2000 and abandoned MT. This reform followed a period when the demand
for base money had become unstable. The new policy framework focuses on medium-
term inflation projections, but is not classified here as an IT regime as inflation rates
were not identified as the sole objective of monetary policy.
Iceland did not have an intermediate target from the 1970s to the 1990s. It main-
tained a managed float but experienced hyperinflation at times. It began to explic-
itly target inflation in 2001, trying to mitigate conflicting pressures relating to the
interest rate, inflation and exchange rates.
The United Kingdom adopted MTs from 1977 to 1986. From October 1990 to
September 1992, it targeted exchange rates by joining the European Monetary Sys-
tem (EMS). The UK became an o cial inflation targeter in 1993 after being forced
out of the fixed exchange rates arrangement and remains an ITer until today. I
classify the time in between these explicit regimes as discretionary frameworks.
Turkey and Japan
Turkey continued pegging to the USD from 1974 until 1981, operated for a few years
without explicit targets and then adopted MT in 1990 but gave it up in 1992. The
adoption of MT was part of the plan for trying to reduce the hyperinflation which
accelerated in 1987 and to accumulate foreign reserves. From 1993, the Central
Bank of Turkey conducted its policies without an explicit target, but it linked its
policy with the balance sheet of the government, trying to supply the large and
growing government financing requirement during the 1991 crisis. Turkey formally
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adopted IT in 2006.
Japan is the only developed country in the survey that has never adopted an explicit
target during the sample period. From 1998, monetary policy in Japan was “excep-
tionally accommodating” (OECD Economic Survey: Japan, 1997) during and even
after the Asian financial crisis and still without an explicit target. In 2013, Japan
adopted an IT framework as a part of Abenomics.
3.3 Selection of determinants
I explore the potential determinants of countries’ MPRs in this section. Most the-
oretical studies in this area focus on the choice between fixed exchange rates and
monetary autonomy. Shambaugh (2004) suggests that there is a trade-o↵ between
fixed exchange rates and monetary autonomy according to the empirical evidence.
Thus only countries with flexible exchange rates are able to pursue other targets such
as money or inflation. For example, Von Hagen et al. (1989) shows that persistent
net intervention in foreign exchange markets has impacts on money supply.
There are abundant literature on the determinants of countries’ ERR choices. The
optimum currency area (OCA) theory predicts small economic size, higher trade
openness and low real shocks will be associated with ERT (Mundell (1961). The
formal idea about the financial view on exchange rate policy arrangements emerged
when Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) brought together the impossible trinity hypoth-
esis and exchange rate arrangements. Countries cannot manage free capital flows,
independent monetary policy and fixed exchange rates at the same time and thus a
trade-o↵ between the three should be observed. Frieden et al. (2000) and Poirson
(2001) suggest that political factors play a role as well.
Kuttner and Posen (2001) with a large dataset of nearly 200 distinct frameworks
spanning three decades show that hard pegs provide a low exchange rate volatil-
ity and inflation environment for countries. However, Bouakez and Rebei (2008)
suggest that the exchange rate pass-through has declined in recent years among
industrialised countries, indicating the impact of exchange rate movements on the
domestic price level has decreased. They attribute this decline largely to the fact
that many countries have switched from ERT to IT.
Though many researchers have included inflation persistence in their models as
it does exist in the post-WWII data, Furthermore, Capistra´n and Ramos-Francia
(2010) find that an inflation targeting framework helps to decrease the dispersion of
long run inflation. However, Carare (2002) discussed the initial conditions necessary
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for IT, arguing that some of them could also be determinants of the adoption of
IT. The paper suggests that macroeconomic stability, which includes inflation, is
required for adoption of IT and thus the association between inflation and IT should
be negative. SamarIna and De Haan (2011) study the determinants of IT adoption
with probit analysis. In this approach, the determinants are assumed to have the
same e↵ects on the adoption of MT, ERT and discretionary framework compared
to IT, which is problematic.
The importance of explicit targets is stressed in the literature. Ruge-Murcia (1995)
supports the importance of credibility from the econometrics perspective as well: the
uncertainty about government policy explains a major part of inflation volatility. In
addition, Bailliu et al. (2003) show that countries with an explicit exchange rate
policy, no matter if it is fixed, intermediate or floating, have better performance in
terms of growth. Clarida et al. (1999) propose a framework to study the e↵ective-
ness of monetary policy, and several policy rules are discussed. Overall, a forward
looking policy with binding constraint and commitment has better performance,
though many problems may emerge during the practice of monetary policy. Estrella
and Mishkin (1997) suggests that monetary aggregates fall considerable short as
information variables. On the other hand, Benati (2008) demonstrates that under
inflation targeting, inflation is purely forward-looking and shows no or little per-
sistence. The study focuses on evidence from many advanced economies and the
results are analogous in all sample countries. This finding makes inflation targeting
appealing to countries with a history of high inflation. McCallum (1995) argues that
central banks can avoid the time-inconsistency problem by admitting that expan-
sionary monetary policy is preferred given that wage- and price-setting process are
forward looking. But a nominal anchor may restrain overly expansionary policies.
Based on the literature stressing the importance of using an explicit target to anchor
the inflation expectations of agents, good political institutions and low inflation are
expected to be associated with the use of explicit targets. Hence it suggests a
negative coe cient on the polity index, which measures the strength of political
institutions, for D, and a positive coe cient on historical inflation for D. Historical
inflation measures the average inflation rate during the previous MPR, and I use the
average inflation of the previous decade for the initial period in the sample. However,
governments with high credibility may be able to pursue multiple objectives at a
low cost in terms of inflation bias. If that is the case, the opposite results will be
expected. The relationship between political institutions and ERT is complicated.
The sustainability view suggests that countries with good political arrangements
have the credibility and ability to maintain fixed exchange rates. However, the
policy crutch view indicates that administrations with low quality of institutions are
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more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates rather than more sophisticated monetary
policy arrangements. Furthermore, the adoption of IT was sometimes accompanied
by a structural change in monetary policy to tackle high inflation or hyperinflation.
Therefore I predict a positive sign for the coe cient on historical inflation for IT.
Collins and Siklos (2004) use an empirical study to show that the US has similar
monetary behaviour to Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the 1990s. It is hard
to di↵erentiate formal IT from disciplined discretionary policy. However Carare
and Stone (2006) find economic size, inflation history, broad money, stock market
capital to GDP ratio and government debt (fiscal dominance) relevant for the choice
between conventional inflation targeting and discretionary inflation targeting in a
cross-sectional setting.
The transmission of monetary policy is not always speedy or complete (Liu et al.
(2008)). Thus the development of financial markets is vital for countries’ MRP
choices. Cobham (2010) suggests that nnly when the transmission channel of mon-
etary policy – the institutional and market infrastructure – is well developed are
central banks able to conduct policies solely through interest rates and operate un-
der frameworks like inflation targeting. The paper provides three categories for
countries’ financial and banking system: basic, intermediate and modern. I expect
that the modern type of financial architecture is associated with an IT framework,
intermediate with MT or discretionary and the basic type with ERT. Mishkin (1999)
also indicates that ERT may promote financial fragility and thus is potentially dan-
gerous without institutional reforms.
Broda (2004) suggests that the dynamic of terms of trade is di↵erent for oil exporters.
Countries with a high volume of oil export are vulnerable to shocks in oil prices and
thus are more likely to adopt flexible exchange rates to o↵set ToT shocks.
I summarise the theories and hypotheses mentioned in table 3.1. For variables for
which I cannot deduce their correlation with specific MPRs from theories, I expect
to observe insignificant coe cients. The default category is ERT, and thus all signs
show the relative likelihood to adopt a certain regime comparing to the ERT.
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Variable Name D MT IT Theoretical or empirical support
Economic size + + + Mundell (1961)
Trade openness       Mundell (1961)
Real shocks + + + Mundell (1961)
Capital account openness + + + Obstfeld and Taylor (2003)
Financial development ? + + Cobham (2010)
Political institutions +/  ? ? Edwards (1996), Von Hagen (1999)
Historical inflation +/  ? + Benati (2008)
Oil export + + + Broda (2004)
Note: The base category is ERT. + positive association,   negative association, ? ambiguous direc-
tion of association.
Table 3.1: Expectations of the results
The determinants such as economic size, trade openness, if the country has a high
inflation and if the country is an oil exporter can be directly measured. Following
Levy Yeyati et al. (2010), I use the standard deviation of the logarithm of terms of
trade to proximate real shocks in the economies. I adopt index measures from Chinn
and Ito (2008), Svirydzenka (2016) and Jaggers and Marshall (2009) to examine the
impacts of capital account openness, financial development and political institutions
respectively. Svirydzenka (2016) provides a new index to financial development.
It measures depth, access and e ciency of financial institutes (FIs) and markets
(FMs). FIs include banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds.
FMs include stock and bond markets.
In table 3.2, the description and sources of the explanatory variables are presented.
Variable Name Measure Calculation Source
Loggdp Economic size Log of GDP OECD
Openness Trade openness (import+export)/GDP OECD
ToTshocks Real shocks Standard deviation of the logarithm of
terms of trade
WDI series
CAopen Financial develop-
ment
Measure of capital openness Chinn and Ito
(2008)
FI Financial institu-
tions
Development of financial institutions Svirydzenka
(2016)
FM Financial markets Development of financial markets Svirydzenka
(2016)
PolityIndex Political Institution Annual Polity scores Jaggers and
Marshall
(2009)
Inflation Historical inflation Average inflation rate during the pre-
vious MPR
OECD
Oilexport Oil exporter Dummy variable: 1 for oil exporter OECD
Table 3.2: Data Description and Source
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Policymakers take past economic conditions in addition to the current situation
into account when setting monetary policies. Thus I use the average value of the
proceeding five years for the explanatory variables that vary considerably between
years. Those variables include economic size, trade openness, polity index. The
procedure also helps us to tackle endogeneity issues. Terms of trade shocks are
measured with the standard deviations of the logarithm of terms of trade for the
preceding five years, and I use the highest value of a country’s ToT shocks to fill
up the missing values. Financial development and being an oil exporter do not
change over a short period of time, and thus contemporary data is used. For the
explanatory variables of the eurozone, I use the average value of eurozone member
countries in the sample except for the log of GDP. The log of the sum of the GDP
of eurozone member countries in the sample is used to measure the economic size of
the eurozone.
3.4 Empirical Results
I present three groups of results: one with OCA factors, one with OCA plus polity
index and capital account openness, and one with all factors I identified in section
3.3. Historical inflation and being an oil exporter are included in all regressions as
control variables. In this way, I can examine the consistency of results.
3.4.1 Main results
Table 3.3 shows main results. In terms of the signs of the parameters, the three
models report similar results except for terms of trade shocks and oil exporter in
model 1. It is possible that financial development influence both countries’ MPR
choices and macro performances, so model 1 may su↵er from endogeneity bias. Hence
I focus on the results from models 2 and 3. The log likelihood decreases and pseudo
r squared increases when I include more variables, which justifies the inclusion of
the financial and political factors.
52
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
D MT IT D MT IT D MT IT
Log of GDP 0.579*** 0.720*** -0.374** 1.020*** 1.102*** -0.575*** 0.965*** 1.049*** -1.414***
(0.0975) (0.135) (0.119) (0.131) (0.193) (0.155) (0.141) (0.199) (0.242)
Trade openness -2.700*** -1.844* -5.614*** -2.838*** -2.872* -6.652*** -2.455*** -2.822* -9.943***
(0.616) (0.928) (0.882) (0.697) (1.291) (1.022) (0.711) (1.287) (1.394)
Terms of trade shocks 1.332 -8.326* -1.517 4.861 -9.977* 3.040 5.007 -11.50* 4.350
(3.071) (3.838) (3.342) (3.682) (4.258) (3.688) (3.921) (4.515) (4.232)
Historical inflation 0.112*** 0.0804*** 0.0499* 0.0856*** 0.0436 0.0116 0.127*** 0.108*** 0.0660*
(0.0191) (0.0244) (0.0204) (0.0181) (0.0229) (0.0254) (0.0259) (0.0311) (0.0285)
Oil exporter 1.493*** -0.577 3.330*** 1.944*** 0.535 3.472*** 1.908*** 0.584 3.968***
(0.431) (0.679) (0.449) (0.520) (0.700) (0.486) (0.525) (0.757) (0.561)
Capital account openness 0.763*** -0.411* 0.850*** 0.706** -0.227 1.561***
(0.211) (0.195) (0.240) (0.226) (0.221) (0.309)
Polity index -0.152 0.00599 -0.873* -0.164 0.0195 -1.508**
(0.105) (0.122) (0.426) (0.106) (0.123) (0.503)
Financial markets 5.526*** 1.065 9.381***
(1.200) (1.450) (1.408)
Financial institutions 1.124 3.076* 1.197
(1.432) (1.280) (1.211)
No. of observations 806 713 713
Pseudo R2 0.352 0.408 0.452
Log likelihood -647.4 -512.4 -473.8
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Note: *,** and *** represent p value at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The base category is ERT. Standard errors in brackets.
Table 3.3: Determinants of countries’ MPR
In model 3, economic size is positively associated with D and MT frameworks, but
negatively associated with IT. High terms of trade shocks increase the countries’
likelihood of choosing D and IT but decrease the likelihood to adopt MT. The OCA
theory predicts that economic size and real shocks are negatively correlated with
ERT. Thus I expect that the signs of those two variables should be positive for D,
MT and IT. However, the results contradict my expectation for large economies are
less likely to do IT rather than ERT, and countries with high real shocks are more
likely to adopt ERT rather than MT. The signs on the coe cients of trade openness
are negative and significant. It fits the hypothesis that countries with high trade
openness are more likely to adopt ERT.
Countries with a high level of historical inflation are more likely to do D, MT and IT.
At the same time, countries with good political institutions are less likely to choose
D and IT, but more likely to do MT. However, the coe cients are insignificant for D
and MT. The coe cients on historical inflation together with polity index support
the sustainability view that countries with good political institutions and reasonable
inflation rate are able to operate a credible ERT.
As expected, the coe cients on oil exporter are positive for D, MT and IT. Oil ex-
porting countries are less likely to choose ERT to control the influence of fluctuations
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in oil prices.
A high degree of capital account openness is associated with D and IT, but insignif-
icantly linked to MT. The results are sensible considering that it is costly to target
ERT and MT directly if the country has a high level of financial openness.
The results show that financial development matters to the choice of MPR. A high
level of financial market development is positively and significantly associated with
the adoption of D and IT, and insignificantly correlated with MT. The coe cients
on financial institutions for D, MT and IT are positive, but insignificant for D and
IT. The results are mostly in line with my predication’s expect for D. It is possible
that countries such as the US and eurozone choose D instead of ERT because of the
superiority of their financial infrastructure. The US and eurozone are able to pursue
multiple objectives without compromising their price stability and thus they choose
discretionary frameworks instead of IT. This case of D is di↵erent from discretionary
policy in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus in the next subsection, I will categorise countries
with implicit policy and good price stability as IT instead of D as a robustness check.
Overall the results suggest that idiosyncratic factors are relevant for countries’ MPR
choices.
Figure 3.2: Predictive margins Determinants of countries’ MPRs
The coe cients can only tell us the sign and the statistical significance level of the
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impacts. However, it is possible for a determinant to have small and significant
impacts on the likelihood of countries’ MPR choices. The predictive margin of
variables can tell us the magnitude and economic significance of the impacts for
each variable. Figure 3.2 shows the predictive margin of the model. Taking the first
graph as example, the predictive margin shows that, keeping other variables constant
at their mean values, for all countries with a loggdp value equal to a particular point
(on the x-axis), the proportion of countries to choose D (MT, ERT or IT depending
on the line) would be equal to the corresponding value on the y-axis. And the sum of
the probabilities of choosing a certain MPR given the particular value of the loggdp
is equal to 1. Thus it suggests that economic size has positive impacts on the choice
of MT and negative impacts on IT, and the magnitudes of the e↵ects are significant
(from 0% to 38% and from 70% to 0% respectively). And interestingly, countries’
probability to adopt ERT increases with economic size until a certain point and
then decreases. Countries’ likelihood to adopt D is increasing with economic size.
Economic size turns out to be vital determinants of countries’ MPRs, given that the
probability to do a certain regime changes significantly with changes in the value of
the log of GDP.
The variables that cause big movements along the y-axis are ones with high eco-
nomic relevance. I scale the y-axis from 0 to 1, so it is easy to identify the major
determinants. Except for economic size, trade openness, the polity index, historical
inflation and FM appear to be major determinants of the MPR choices.
Keeping other variables constant at their mean values, countries with high trade
openness are likely to adopt ERT with probability equal to 1, while economies
with low trade openness are more likely to adopt IT. Economies with low political
institutions are likely to do IT with a high probability. The reason behind it could be
that, among original OECD member countries, after Greece joined the eurozone, the
only case of ERT is Denmark which has the highest level of the polity index. It seems
that, though worldwide it is countries with good political environments that are more
likely to conduct IT, it is not the same among advanced economies. The likelihood of
countries choosing IT decreases with increases in the polity index. Arising historical
inflation from its minimum value of -0.8% to its maximum (59.2%) would increase the
probability that countries do D (MT) from 10% (5%) to 70% (20%), and decrease the
likelihood that countries choose ERT from 70% to 0. The probability for countries
to do IT increases with historical inflation and then decreases with it. Carare (2002)
suggests that relatively stable macroeconomic conditions are required to adopt IT.
Thus I observe that countries are likely to adopt IT to tackle inflation, but the
initial inflation cannot be too high when the central bank announces the adoption.
Countries’ propensity to do ERT decreases from 0.8 to 0.2 with increasing in financial
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market development, while the probability to do IT and D increases from 0 to 0.42
and 0.38 respectively. Financial market development has a negative but insignificant
influence on countries’ likelihood to adopt MT. Being an oil exporter increases the
probability that countries adopt IT from 20% to nearly 60%, while decrease the
likelihood of doing ERT from 58% to 20%. Other variables, though statistically
significant, have less determinant power on the choice of countries’ MPR.
ERT D MT IT
Log of GDP -0.0192 0.0998*** 0.0442*** -0.125***
(0.0139) (0.0110) (0.00997) (0.0133)
Trade openness 0.762*** 0.0369 -0.152* -0.647***
(0.0811) (0.0667) (0.0743) (0.0849)
Terms of trade shocks -0.0555 0.614 -0.642** 0.0827
(0.417) (0.329) (0.241) (0.334)
Historical inflation -0.0143*** 0.00615*** 0.00187 0.00629***
(0.00274) (0.00172) (0.00148) (0.00167)
Oil exporter -0.331*** 0.0686 -0.00158 0.264***
(0.0562) (0.0396) (0.0420) (0.0322)
Capital account openness -0.104*** 0.0337 -0.0329** 0.103***
(0.0225) (0.0197) (0.0123) (0.0214)
Polity index 0.0201 -0.0153* 0.00530 -0.0101
(0.0169) (0.00742) (0.00726) (0.00943)
Financial markets -0.714*** 0.258** -0.182* 0.638***
(0.115) (0.0978) (0.0799) (0.0909)
Financial institutions -0.146 -0.00731 0.0968 0.0562
(0.119) (0.127) (0.0707) (0.102)
Note: Average marginal e↵ects of determinants reported. *,** and *** rep-
resent p value at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The base category is ERT.
Standard errors in brackets.
Table 3.4: Average marginal e↵ects of determinants of countries’ MPR
Table 3.4 presents the average marginal e↵ects of explanatory variables. The values
show how changes in variables impact the probability of choosing a certain regime.
The conclusion we draw from marginal e↵ects is similar to the plots of predictive
margins, that economic size, trade openness, historical inflation, being an oil ex-
porter, capital account openness and financial markets are both economically and
statistically significant. The importance of capital account openness is less obvious
in the graph. However, simply averaging the marginal e↵ects may neglect impor-
tant relationship between idiosyncratic factors and regime choices. The impact of
economic size on ERT is insignificant in the table, but the plot of predictive mar-
gins shows that countries’ probability of doing ERT increases with ERT and then
decrease with it. This non-monotonic relationship will be neglected if we only look
at the average. The prediction of OCA theory on economic size is partially met.
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3.4.2 Robustness checks
In this section, I conduct three robustness checks. First I separate disciplined and
undisciplined discretion. The discretionary framework with an average inflation rate
over the preceding five years around 2% (1% to 3%) for a consecutive number of
years is defined as disciplined D. The discretionary framework that does not fit this
criterion is defined as undisciplined D. In a robustness check, I treat disciplined D
as informal IT. Hence D includes undisciplined discretion only and I combine IT
and informal IT. The countries operate disciplined discretion are Japan from 1985
to 1995, Norway from 1995 to 2000, and the US from 1996 to 2007 and from 2009
to 2011.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
D MT IT D MT IT D MT IT
Log of GDP -0.094 0.587*** 0.163 0.127 0.927*** -0.575*** -0.204 0.849*** 0.299**
(0.127) (0.130) (0.085) (0.161) (0.180) (0.155) (0.196) (0.187) (0.114)
Trade openness -7.853*** -2.394* -3.510*** -8.490*** -3.469** -6.652*** -10.310*** -3.671** -3.971***
(1.302) (0.946) (0.549) (1.451) (1.297) (1.022) (1.657) (1.294) (0.624)
Terms of trade shocks -2.654 -9.320* 2.284 1.755 -11.11** 3.040 -0.455 -14.830** 1.881
(3.139) (3.832) (2.991) (3.779) (4.272) (3.688) (4.136) (4.650) (3.590)
Historical inflation 0.090*** 0.073*** 0.049** 0.078*** 0.049* 0.012 0.146*** 0.130*** 0.104***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.030 (0.025)
Oil exporter 1.573** -0.597 2.839*** 1.876** 0.598 3.472*** 1.700* 0.628 2.931***
(0.525) (0.680) (0.418) (0.630) (0.703) (0.486) (0.710) (0.802) (0.482)
Capital account openness 0.978*** -0.360 0.850*** 1.072*** -0.0921 1.121***
(0.210) (0.189) (0.240) (0.235) (0.218) (0.239)
Polity index -0.219 -0.0440 -0.873* -0.266 -0.0538 0.768
(0.162) (0.166) (0.426) (0.194) (0.190) (0.427)
Financial markets 5.853*** 0.684 5.370***
(1.277) (1.425) (1.007)
Financial institutions 4.226** 4.460** -2.590*
(1.518) (1.363) (1.072)
No. of observations 806 713 713
Pseudo R2 0.335 0.408 0.408
Log likelihood -660.0 -512.4 -505.9
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Note: *,** and *** represent p-value at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The base category is ERT. Standard errors in brackets.
Table 3.5: Treating constrained discretion as inflation targeting
The results in table 3.5 are mostly close to the results in table 3.3, but there are
several di↵erences in the parameters for D and IT. The sign of the parameter on
economic size for D is negative and insignificant in the robustness check, and is
significantly positive in the main regression. The parameter on economic size for
IT is significantly positive in the robustness test, and is significantly negative in the
main regression. The reason behind the reverse of the signs on economic size for D
and IT might be that I classify disciplined D as IT in table 3.5. And hence large
economies such as the US and eurozone are doing IT instead of D. The parameter
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of terms of trade shocks for D is negative in the robustness check and positive in the
main regression, however, these results are statistically insignificant in both cases.
The signs of parameter of polity index on MT and IT are di↵erent in the main
regression and the robustness check. Countries with good political environment are
more likely to adopt IT instead of ERT, and more likely to do ERT instead of D
and MT. But these results on polity index are insignificant in the robustness check.
The signs on the coe cients of FI are di↵erent for IT, but insignificant in the main
regression and significant in the second regression. Again the change might be due
to that economies with good FI development are able to conduct D with low cost in
terms of inflation bias. Hence when I reclassify disciplined D, the parameter on FI
changes accordingly. The magnitudes of the parameters di↵er, but the magnitude
of the coe cients is hard to interpret in limited dependent variable models. Thus I
will focus on the predictive margins in figure 4.3.
Figure 3.3: Predictive margins Treating constrained discretion as inflation target-
ing
The conclusions I draw from the predictive margins in the robustness check is similar:
economic size, trade openness, capital account openness, the polity index, historical
inflation, being an oil exporter and financial market development are major deter-
minants. However, countries with large economic size are more likely to do IT when
I treat disciplined D as informal IT. Countries’ likelihood to do D decreases with
58
increasing in the polity index. Other factors are relatively less important determi-
nants, with less power to alter the probability of choices. Table 3.6 give basically
identical conclusion about the economic significance of the determinants.
ERT D MT IT
Log of GDP -0.0498*** -0.0380** 0.0525*** 0.0352**
(0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0104) (0.0136)
Trade openness 0.763*** -0.612*** -0.0373 -0.114
(0.0815) (0.120) (0.0766) (0.0772)
Terms of trade shocks 0.425 0.125 -0.920*** 0.369
(0.425) (0.281) (0.262) (0.394)
Historical inflation -0.0175*** 0.00595*** 0.00490** 0.00668*
(0.00295) (0.00164) (0.00156) (0.00265)
Oil exporter -0.307*** 0.0274 -0.0122 0.292***
(0.0640) (0.0466) (0.0444) (0.0466)
Capital account openness -0.118*** 0.0479** -0.0313* 0.101***
(0.0238) (0.0165) (0.0123) (0.0266)
Polity index -0.0510 -0.0444* -0.00601 0.101*
(0.0378) (0.0173) (0.00990) (0.0502)
Financial markets -0.628*** 0.268** -0.0918 0.451***
(0.116) (0.0879) (0.0811) (0.108)
Financial institutions -0.0898 0.343** 0.233** -0.486***
(0.120) (0.112) (0.0787) (0.128)
Note: Average marginal e↵ects of determinants reported. *,** and *** rep-
resent p value at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The base category is ERT.
Standard errors in brackets.
Table 3.6: Average marginal e↵ects treating constrained discretion as inflation
targeting
Next, I delete all eurozone countries from the sample after 1999 (2001 for Greece)
and only treat the eurozone countries as a single unit. Table 3.7 shows the results
for the second robustness check. There are several di↵erences between these results
and those for the main regression. The coe cients on terms of trade shocks for
D and IT are insignificant in both models, but positive in table 3.3 and negative
in table 3.7. Historical inflation is significantly and positively associated with D,
MT and IT in the main regression. In the robustness check, the coe cient on
historical inflation is insignificant for IT. The parameter of capital account openness
on MT is statistically insignificant in the main regression and when I only include
the eurozone as one single unit, but the sign on it are opposite. The parameters of
financial institutions development on D and MT are positive and insignificant in the
main regression. But these parameters are negative in this robustness check, and
significant for IT. Countries with good FI development are more likely to do MT
rather than ERT, and less likely to choose D and IT comparing to ERT.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
D MT IT D MT IT D MT IT
Log of GDP 0.488*** 0.842*** -0.269 0.769*** 1.053*** -0.854*** 0.809*** 1.051*** -1.182***
(0.117) (0.150) (0.156) (0.146) (0.199) (0.243) (0.152) (0.206) (0.314)
Trade openness -7.077*** -1.956 -9.857*** -9.726*** -5.383** -15.26*** -10.55*** -5.715** -18.31***
(1.181) (1.172) (1.439) (1.566) (1.780) (2.114) (1.690) (1.904) (2.407)
Terms of trade shocks -6.801 -11.71** -9.733* -2.250 -13.39** -3.930 -4.123 -16.41** -6.957
(3.934) (4.179) (4.683) (5.094) (4.774) (5.470) (5.410) (5.126) (5.880)
Historical inflation 0.150*** 0.114*** 0.0987*** 0.0881** 0.0478 0.00159 0.126** 0.132** 0.0373
(0.0243) (0.0277) (0.0259) (0.0307) (0.0320) (0.0402) (0.0465) (0.0472) (0.0496)
Oil exporter 1.711*** -0.710 3.413*** 2.609*** 0.765 4.466*** 2.410*** 0.366 4.573***
(0.485) (0.686) (0.543) (0.695) (0.751) (0.727) (0.668) (0.859) (0.752)
Capital account openness 1.127*** -0.138 1.756*** 1.017*** 0.0365 2.212***
(0.245) (0.207) (0.358) (0.271) (0.235) (0.430)
Polity index -0.295 -0.0991 -1.956** -0.283 -0.0413 -2.248**
(0.223) (0.215) (0.657) (0.207) (0.200) (0.702)
Financial markets 7.241*** 2.200 9.980***
(1.629) (1.678) (1.973)
Financial institutions -1.250 3.308* -3.505*
(1.626) (1.371) (1.634)
No. of observations 622 543 543
Pseudo R2 0.408 0.507 0.540
Log likelihood -498.2 -357.8 -333.9
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Note: *,** and *** represent p-value at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The base category is ERT. Standard errors in brackets.
Table 3.7: Treating eurozone countries as a single unit
Figure 3.4 shows the predictive margins for the second robustness check. The results
are similar to the main regression. The impacts of economic size and the polity index
on countries’ MPR choices are in accordance with the main regression instead of the
previous robustness check.
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Figure 3.4: Predictive margins Treating eurozone countries as a single unit
Table 3.8 shows the results for the third robustness check, in which I only include the
eurozone countries separately and treat them as ERT. This set of results is similar
to the main regression with two di↵erences. The coe cient of economic size on D
is significant and negative in the robustness check, but it is significant and positive
in the main regression. The di↵erence is likely due to the exclusion of the eurozone
as a single unit. The parameter of the polity index on MT is insignificant in both
cases, but is negative in this robustness check and positive in the main regression.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
D MT IT D MT IT D MT IT
Log of GDP -0.180 0.527*** -0.573*** 0.160 0.973*** -0.678*** -0.459* 0.862*** -1.669***
(0.135) (0.140) (0.125) (0.176) (0.209) (0.159) (0.224) (0.221) (0.253)
Trade openness -9.843*** -2.800** -6.802*** -10.14*** -3.519* -7.557*** -13.66*** -3.602* -12.20***
(1.379) (1.040) (1.027) (1.592) (1.479) (1.131) (1.865) (1.523) (1.592)
Terms of trade shocks -2.558 -9.067* -2.187 1.952 -11.02* 2.389 0.767 -13.52** 4.506
(3.086) (3.877) (3.367) (3.723) (4.308) (3.716) (4.174) (4.633) (4.348)
Historical inflation 0.0659*** 0.0536* 0.0189 0.0722*** 0.0427 0.0130 0.122*** 0.117*** 0.0763**
(0.0167) (0.0225) (0.0183) (0.0177) (0.0224) (0.0257) (0.0262) (0.0308) (0.0293)
Oil exporter 2.274*** -0.492 3.244*** 2.733*** 0.695 3.467*** 3.081*** 0.900 4.053***
(0.473) (0.678) (0.446) (0.577) (0.703) (0.482) (0.604) (0.768) (0.560)
Capital account openness 1.002*** -0.386 0.897*** 1.112*** -0.185 1.665***
(0.213) (0.199) (0.243) (0.253) (0.226) (0.322)
Polity index -0.204 -0.0331 -0.701 -0.330 -0.0766 -1.208*
(0.147) (0.152) (0.434) (0.207) (0.197) (0.515)
Financial markets 9.462*** 1.725 10.70***
(1.403) (1.460) (1.483)
Financial institutions 1.635 3.462** 1.334
(1.474) (1.300) (1.232)
No. of observations 792 699 3.534 699
Pseudo R2 0.375 0.422 0.488
Log likelihood -610.2 -486.4 -431.3
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Note: *,** and *** represent p-value at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The base category is ERT. Standard errors in brackets.
Table 3.8: Treating eurozone countries separately
Figure 3.5 shows the predictive margins of the robustness check that I only include
the eurozone countries separately as ERT. The economic significance and direction
of impacts are mostly consistent with the main regression. The major di↵erence is
that countries’ probability of doing D decreases with increases in economic size, but
the change in predictive margin is limited.
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Figure 3.5: Predictive margins Excluding the eurozone as a single unit
Table 3.9 displays the average marginal e↵ects of alternative treatments of eurozone
countries. The indications of the economic importance of determinants are similar
by looking at the plots of predictive margins and average marginal e↵ects. The only
di↵erent is that in the second robustness check of eurozone countries where I include
the eurozone countries separately but not as a single unit: from average marginal
e↵ects, economic size has positive and significant impacts on the probability of doing
ERT, but from figure 3.5, we see that the association is not monotonic.
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Eurozone countries as a single unit Eurozone countries seperately
ERT D MT IT ERT D MT IT
Log of GDP -0.0461*** 0.0993*** 0.0569*** -0.110*** 0.0633*** -0.0082 0.0598*** -0.115***
(0.0110) (0.0130) (0.0115) (0.0157) -0.0171 -0.0147 -0.0123 -0.0143
Trade openness 0.905*** -0.0481 -0.203* -0.654*** 1.262*** -0.712*** -0.022 -0.529***
(0.101) (0.0974) (0.102) (0.103) -0.106 -0.115 -0.0905 -0.093
Terms of trade shocks 0.916* 0.441 -0.956** -0.401 0.299 0.0826 -0.621* 0.239
(0.416) (0.409) (0.317) (0.373) -0.398 -0.286 -0.249 -0.335
Historical inflation -0.0129** 0.00461* 0.00410 0.00418* -0.0127*** 0.00441** 0.00233 0.00600***
(0.00408) (0.00221) (0.00232) (0.00199) -0.00253 -0.00146 -0.00151 -0.00169
Oil exporter -0.195*** 0.00604 -0.0254 0.214*** -0.358*** 0.118** 0.00245 0.237***
(0.0584) (0.0468) (0.0569) (0.0375) -0.0524 -0.0374 -0.0424 -0.0333
Capital account openness -0.0971*** 0.0213 -0.0390* 0.115*** -0.115*** 0.0422* -0.0346** 0.107***
(0.0186) (0.0244) (0.0158) (0.0247) -0.0218 -0.0169 -0.0128 -0.0217
Polity index 0.0200 -0.0184 0.00685 -0.00848 0.0393 -0.0196* 0.00124 -0.0209
(0.0210) (0.00945) (0.0114) (0.00966) -0.0273 -0.00957 -0.0102 -0.0145
Financial markets -0.608*** 0.249* -0.152 0.511*** -0.860*** 0.426*** -0.208* 0.642***
(0.118) (0.116) (0.106) (0.100) -0.108 -0.0877 -0.0814 -0.0931
Financial institutions -0.0386 -0.0437 0.239* -0.157 -0.192 0.0397 0.102 0.0509
(0.104) (0.147) (0.0951) (0.123) -0.108 -0.108 -0.0703 -0.104
Note: Average marginal e↵ects of determinants reported. *,** and *** represent p value at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The
base category is ERT. Standard errors in brackets.
Table 3.9: Average marginal e↵ects Treatments of eurozone countries
Overall, results from the three robustness tests are close to results from the main
regression. Economic size, trade openness, capital account openness, being an oil
exporter, the polity index, historical inflation and financial development are statis-
tically and economically significant to the choice of MPR. I summarise results from
the main test and three robustness regressions in table 3.10 and list my expectations.
Only consistent results in all three models are reported.
Expetations Emprical results
D MT IT D MT IT
Log of GDP + + + + ⇤ ⇤⇤
Trade openness         ⇤ ⇤⇤  ⇤   ⇤ ⇤⇤
Terms of trade shocks + + +  ⇤
Historical inflation +/  + + ⇤ ⇤ + ⇤ ⇤ +
Oil exporter + + + +⇤ + + ⇤ ⇤⇤
Capital account openness + + + + ⇤ ⇤ + ⇤ ⇤⇤
Polity index +/   
Financial markets + + + ⇤ ⇤⇤ + + ⇤ ⇤⇤
Financial institutions + + +⇤
Note: The least significant results among di↵erent groups are reported, and incon-
sistent results are not reported.*,** and *** represent p value at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively. The base category is ERT.
Table 3.10: Summary of results for the determinants of de jure MPR choices
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As discussed, the results are mostly in line with the predictions from the OCA theory,
the sustainability view of fixed exchange rates, Broda (2004), Obstfeld and Taylor
(2003) and Cobham (2010). This study is focused on the original OECD mem-
bers, and hence mostly advanced economies. This explains many of the di↵erences
between the results and predictions.
3.4.3 De facto objectives of countries monetary policy
Cobham (2015) provides a statistical analysis on what advanced economies are try-
ing to stabilise with their monetary policy. The de facto objective (objectives) of
countries is di↵erent from monetary policy regime choices since pre-announced tar-
gets and economic consequences associated with the pre-announcement of the regime
are not considered. In this section, I study if the potential determinants of de jure
classification have any explanatory power for de facto objectives. However, since
the classification are di↵erent, there is no direct comparability between the two sets
of results.
I re-classify Cobham’s (2015) classification into five course categories: ERT (single
objective of growth of exchange rates and monetary union, 0), MT (single objective
of monetary growth, 1), GDPT (single objective of growth of either nominal or real
GDP, 2), PT (single objective of growth of price level or multiple objectives subject
to a price stability constraint, 3) and D (unconstrained multiple objectives, 4). The
reason that I combine the constrained multiple (CM) objectives with PT rather
than unconstrained multiple (UM) objectives is that both CM and PT are sophisti-
cated monetary framework arrangements, and I predict that similar country-specific
factors are associated with doing CM and PT. Figure 3.7 shows the transition of
countries’ MPR. Though the composition of countries adopting certain regimes looks
di↵erent from the de jure MPR one, the trend is similar: over time more countries
try to stabilise the price level directly through single objective or constrained mul-
tiple objectives, and a group of countries (mainly eurozone countries) continue to
stabilise ERT.
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Figure 3.6: De facto classification
Data Source: Cobham (2015).
The results are presented in table 3.11. From model one to model three, the results
are similar in terms of the significance levels and the signs of the parameters. Only
a few variables are statistically significant. Economic size is positively associated
with SM. Trade openness is negatively correlated with all non-ERT choices. Terms
of trade shocks are positively associated with all non-ERT choices, though only
significant for SM. The results from de facto monetary policy arrangements fit the
OCA theory closely.
A high level of historical inflation is positively correlated with SP, MC and MU, and
negatively associated with SM. Being an oil exporter is positively and significantly
associated with all non-ERT choices. Countries with a high level of capital account
openness are more likely to do ERT rather than other arrangements, but only the
coe cient on MU is significant. Financial markets and institutions development
are both relevant to the choice of countries’ monetary policy objectives. Coun-
tries with high financial market development are significantly more likely to choose
sophisticated arrangements such as single objective of income (nominal and real),
price level and constrained multiple objectives. Financial institution development
increases countries’ propensity to adopt SY. The polity index is significant in the de
jure MPR results but is insignificant in de facto tests.
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model 1 model 2 model 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
SM SY SP+MC MU SM SY SP+MC MU SM SY SP+MC MU
Log of GDP 0.116 0.274 0.0341 -0.293* 0.522* 0.630** 0.227* 0.0298 0.658** 0.499 0.109 -0.0538
(0.212) (0.211) (0.0795) (0.125) (0.255) (0.235) (0.100) (0.199) (0.249) (0.265) (0.109) (0.206)
Trade openness -5.651*** -4.386** -1.726*** -2.784*** -5.990*** -4.740** -2.317*** -5.044*** -6.086*** -4.527** -2.300*** -4.783**
(1.571) (1.512) (0.327) (0.657) (1.635) (1.509) (0.473) (1.517) (1.534) (1.648) (0.493) (1.529)
Terms of trade shocks 13.68* 8.503 4.995 5.712 8.774 2.160 1.872 0.114 15.41* 1.659 3.519 1.145
(5.496) (6.441) (3.108) (3.956) (6.368) (6.919) (3.608) (5.367) (6.782) (7.288) (3.826) (5.524)
Historical inflation -0.202* 0.0148 0.0443 0.187*** -0.252* 0.0206 0.0543 0.283*** -0.283* 0.137 0.112* 0.319***
(0.0875) (0.0578) (0.0331) (0.0352) (0.123) (0.0824) (0.0480) (0.0595) (0.134) (0.0930) (0.0513) (0.0631)
Oil exporter 3.484*** 2.385* 2.835*** 2.343** 4.045*** 2.924** 3.074*** 3.272*** 4.072*** 2.762* 2.858*** 3.168***
(0.886) (1.065) (0.739) (0.841) (0.932) (1.089) (0.746) (0.888) (0.947) (1.114) (0.752) (0.895)
Capital account openness -0.412 -0.727* -0.130 -0.695** -0.129 -0.560 -0.0925 -0.607*
(0.339) (0.347) (0.201) (0.238) (0.358) (0.373) (0.210) (0.249)
Polity index 0.0282 -0.0208 0.0593 0.215 0.0179 -0.154 0.0157 0.194
(0.0751) (0.295) (0.129) (0.125) (0.0821) (0.327) (0.135) (0.126)
Financial markets -1.781 4.131* 4.156*** 1.150
(2.087) (1.809) (0.878) (1.513)
Financial institutions -2.199 5.774* 1.447 0.692
(2.125) (2.360) (1.010) (1.473)
No. of observations 806 713 713
Pseudo R2 0.358 0.417 0.441
Log likelihood -688.0 -551.2 -527.9
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Note: *,** and *** represent p value at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The base category is ERT. Standard errors in brackets.
Table 3.11: Determinants of countries’ de facto monetary policy objectives
I plot the predictive margins of each variable in graph 3.7 and examine the impacts
of each variable on the proportion of countries to choose a specific arrangement.
Similar to the main results trade openness, historical inflation, being an oil exporter
and financial market development are vital determinants of countries’ MPRs.
Trade openness has a large e↵ect on the probability of countries to choose de facto
ERT as well: as trade openness increases, the probability of countries doing ERT
increases from 10% to 100%. A high historical inflation rate increases countries’
probability to do unconstrained multiple objectives from 0 to 100%. With increasing
in historical inflation, countries’ likelihood to adopt ERT, MT and PT drops. Both
financial market and institution development increase countries’ probability of doing
SP and MC. Financial development factors decrease the chance of countries doing
primitive monetary arrangements like ERT and MT. Similar to the results of de
jure analyses, FM development plays a larger role in determining countries’ de facto
monetary policy arrangements comparing to FI development.
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Figure 3.7: Predictive magins Determinants of countries’ de facto monetary policy
arrangements
The scale and significance of average marginal e↵ects are consistent with the plots
of predictive margins. Trade openness, historical inflation, being an oil exporter
and financial markets are significant for most choices. From table 3.12, it is worth
noting that terms of trade shocks have large impacts on countries’ chance to do MT
and financial institutions have a large influence on countries’ probability to adopt
income targeting.
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ERT SM SY SP+MC MU
Log of GDP -0.0168 0.0210* 0.0129 -0.00145 -0.0157
(0.0125) (0.00868) (0.00839) (0.0164) (0.0113)
Trade openness 0.335*** -0.127* -0.0598 -0.0145 -0.133
(0.0528) (0.0530) (0.0522) (0.0932) (0.0888)
Terms of trade shocks -0.460 0.482* -0.0617 0.232 -0.192
(0.441) (0.225) (0.213) (0.506) (0.275)
Historical inflation -0.0130* -0.0154*** 0.00122 0.0102 0.0169***
(0.00575) (0.00442) (0.00251) (0.00638) (0.00255)
Oil exporter -0.349*** 0.0609** 0.00640 0.242** 0.0401
(0.0861) (0.0213) (0.0271) (0.0779) (0.0314)
Capital account openness 0.0190 0.00348 -0.0127 0.0196 -0.0294**
(0.0241) (0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0255) (0.0101)
Polity index -0.00287 -0.000771 -0.00664 -0.00189 0.0122*
(0.0147) (0.00333) (0.0103) (0.0194) (0.00557)
Financial markets -0.421*** -0.166* 0.0560 0.624*** -0.0935
(0.0946) (0.0704) (0.0533) (0.115) (0.0800)
Financial institutions -0.162 -0.130 0.166* 0.155 -0.0288
(0.117) (0.0695) (0.0729) (0.139) (0.0710)
Note: Average marginal e↵ects of determinants reported. *,** and *** represent p
value at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The base category is ERT. Standard errors in
brackets.
Table 3.12: Average marginal e↵ects de facto monetary policy objectives
The direction and size of the e↵ects of the determinants are similar in the de jure
MPR and de facto objective studies. Trade openness, historical inflation, being
an oil exporter and financial market development appear to be the most critical
determinants of both countries’ de jure and de facto monetary policy arrangements.
3.5 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, I develop a chronology of de jure
classification of countries’ MPR for the post- Bretton Woods period for early OECD
member countries. Second, I find several potential determinants of countries’ MPRs
from the literature and examine their significance.
I have tried to include more country-specific factors mentioned in the previous liter-
ature, but this study is restricted by data availability. Some variables such as central
bank independence are dropped because no consistent time series can be found for
all the countries in the sample. Though I want to extend this study to emerging
and developing economies, information regarding monetary policy arrangements and
explanatory variables for those economies are limited for the early years.
The results of this study suggest that economic size, trade openness, historical in-
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flation, capital account openness, being an oil exporter, financial development and
political institutions all have a role in determining countries’ de jure MPRs. Among
them, economic size, trade openness, historical inflation and financial market devel-
opment have a higher determinant power. The results are mostly in line with the
predictions from the OCA theory, the sustainability view of fixed exchange rates,
Broda (2004), Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) and Cobham (2010). Using Cobham
(2015)’s empirical study on what developed economies are trying to stabilise with
monetary policy, I find that country-specific factors can also explain the de facto ob-
jectives of countries monetary policy arrangements in some degree. Trade openness,
historical inflation and financial development remain vital determinants.
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3.6 Appendix
Country Year Regime Source
AUSTRALIA 1974-1975 D OECD Economic Survey
1976-1985 MT OECD Economic Survey, Tease
(1988)
1986-1992 D OECD Economic Survey
1993-2012 IT OECD Economic Survey
AUSTRIA 1974-1980 ERT** OECD Economic Survey
1981-1998 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1999-2012 EMU OECD Economic Survey
BELGIUM 1974-1998 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1999-2012 EMU OECD Economic Survey
CANADA 1974 D OECD Economic Survey
1975-1982 MT Mishkin (2001), OECD Economic
Survey
1983-1990 D OECD Economic Survey
1991-2012 IT OECD Economic Survey
DENMARK 1074-2012 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012), Cen-
tral Bank Website
FINLAND 1974-1977 ERT** OECD Economic Survey, Ilzetzki
et al. (2011)
1978-1992 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1993-1996 ERT * IT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012), Ilzet-
zki et al. (2011)
1997-1998 IT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1999-2012 EMU OECD Economic Survey
FRANCE 1974-1976 D OECD Economic Survey
1977-1978 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1979-1998 ERT *
MT
Mahadeva and Sterne (2012), Ilzet-
zki et al. (2011)
1999-2012 EMU OECD Economic Survey
GERMANY 1974-1998 MT Ilzetzki et al. (2011), Mishkin (2001)
1999-2012 EMU OECD Economic Survey
GREECE 1974-1994 MT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1995-2000 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012), Ilzet-
zki et al. (2011)
2001-2012 EMU OECD Economic Survey
ICELAND 1974-2000 D Gumundsson and Kristinsson
(1997)
2001-2012 IT OECD Economic Survey
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IRELAND 1974-1998 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1999-2012 EMU OECD Economic Survey
ITALY 1974-1978 D OECD Economic Survey
1979-1983 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1984-1992 ERT *
MT
Mahadeva and Sterne (2012), Ilzet-
zki et al. (2011)
1993-1996 MT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012), Ilzet-
zki et al. (2011)
1997-1998 ERT *
MT
Mahadeva and Sterne (2012), Ilzet-
zki et al. (2011)
1999-2012 EMU OECD Economic Survey
JAPAN 1974-1998 D Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1999-2012 D OECD Economic Survey
LUXEMBOURG 1974-1998 ERT OECD Economic Survey
1999-2012 EMU OECD Economic Survey
NETHERLANDS 1974-1998 ERT Ilzetzki et al. (2011)
1998-2012 MU OECD Economic Survey
NEW
ZEALAND
1974-1983 ERT** Ilzetzki et al. (2011), Sullivan (2013)
1985-1988 D OECD Economic Survey
1989-2012 IT OECD Economic Survey
NORWAY 1974-1994 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1995-2000 D OECD Economic Survey
2001-2012 IT OECD Economic Survey
PORTUGAL 1974-1977 D OECD Economic Survey
1978-1990 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1991-1992 MT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1973-1998 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1999-2012 EMU OECD Economic Survey
SPAIN 1974-1988 D OECD Economic Survey
1989-1993 ERT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
1994-1998 ERT * IT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012), Ilzet-
zki et al. (2011)
1999-2012 EMU OECD Economic Survey
SWEDEN 1974-1992 ERT OECD Economic Survey
1993-2012 IT Hammond (2012)
SWITZERLAND 1974-1999 MT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012),
Mishkin (2001)
2000-2012 D OECD Economic Survey
TURKEY 1974-1981 ERT OECD Economic Survey
1982-1989 D OECD Economic Survey
1990-1992 MT Mahadeva and Sterne (2012)
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1993-2005 D OECD Economic Survey
2006-2012 IT Hammond (2012)
UNITED KING-
DOM
1974-1976 D OECD Economic Survey
1977-1986 MT Mishkin (2001), OECD Economic
Survey
1987-1989 D OECD Economic Survey
1990-1992 ERT OECD Economic Survey, Cobham
(2002)
1993-2012 IT Hammond (2012)
UNITED
STATES
1974-1987 MT Mishkin (2001), OECD Economic
Survey
1988-2011 D OECD Economic Survey, Garrison
(2009)
2012 IT OECD Economic Survey
D: Discretion. MT: Monetary Targeting.
ERT: Exchange Rate Targeting. ERT**: ERT by IMF
IT: Inflation Targeting. EMU: European Monetary Union.
Table 3.13: Countries’ monetary policy regimes and data sources
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CHAPTER 4 – FINANCIAL CONTAGION AND INTER-
NATIONAL RISK SHARING
4.1 Introduction
This paper studies two by-products of financial integration, international risk sharing
and financial contagion with a theoretical model built upon Huggett (1993). I find
that the relationship between financial integration and consumption smoothing is
not monotonic, indicating there is a trade-o↵ between the benefits of international
risk sharing and the costs of financial contagion induced by unexpected negative
shocks as observed in recent history.
The conventional wisdom suggests that we should move towards full financial inte-
gration to improve international risk sharing. However, empirical studies find that
though there is a wide removal of capital controls, the international risk sharing is
still limited. Heathcote and Perri (2004) and Sørensen et al. (2007) suggest that
increasing financial integration is accompanied by a of trend home bias which is
key to understanding the slow growth in international risk sharing. Bai and Zhang
(2012) find that incomplete markets and limited enforceability of contracts in debt
markets provide an explanation for limited international risk sharing. Krueger and
Uhlig (2006) indicate that risk sharing can only be observed when interest rates
are high. Some studies find that low risk sharing is a choice since the gain from
sharing is small. Lucas (1987) and Cole and Obstfeld (1991) use empirical studies
to show that the gain from international risk sharing is limited. Though Obstfeld
(1998), using data from developing countries, finds that the gain from risk sharing
is larger than previously predicted when consumption variability is high, overall the
size of international risk sharing stays low. Tesar (1995) suggests that the gains from
international risk sharing are insignificant when countries are able to “self-insure”.
Thus in the model, I allow for regional in addition to international risk sharing and
measure the “additional” gain.
Obstfeld (1998) raised concerns over the trade-o↵ between risk sharing and financial
contagion after the Asian financial crisis broke out in 1997, and suggested that in
general the benefits of financial integration outweigh the costs and thus full and
undistorted financial openness is preferable. However, a growing literature is chal-
lenging this idea and focuses on the study of global financial crisis. Most studies
attribute the recent widespread sub-prime crisis to contagion. The disruption of fi-
nancial sector matters because it may a↵ect real activities and consumption. Gertler
et al. (2010) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) each presents a closed economy
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general equilibrium model showing how financial activities could influence produc-
tion and consumption.
There are many potential channels for financial contagion. Dasgupta (2004) suggests
that there are two types of contagion: one is from the spread of adverse information
and the other is from linked portfolios and balance sheets among financial interme-
diaries. Kyle and Xiong (2001) use diverse but connected trader market to illustrate
that financial contagion could happen through wealth e↵ects. The traders who trade
actively in di↵erent markets could spread the financial distress from one market to
another when their wealth decreases. To insure against liquidity mismatch, agents
and institutions in Allen and Gale (2000), Caballero and Simsek (2013) and Ci-
fuentes et al. (2005) cross-hold assets of others. Thus when prices of asset or debt
change due to fire-sale by one agent or a subgroup of agents, the whole financial
market fails. Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) show that financial integration causes
increased borrowing in the US and the spillover of the asset price shock to other
countries. Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) focus on the self-fulfilling crisis, showing
that contagion happens because countries share common investors and the crisis in
one country makes investors more averse to the risk in all areas. Bacchetta and
Van Wincoop (2013) also indicate that large spikes in risk among countries in the
recent financial crisis episode are not directly caused by financial linkage or shocks to
macroeconomic fundamentals. For instance, countries that are more exposed to US
assets are not directly more a↵ected by the crisis. They set up a two-country model
to illustrate self-fulfilling shifts in risk (multi-equilibria). However, they conclude
that multi-equilibria cannot fully explain the sudden and global-wide risk spikes. I
do not discuss which is a more probable channel for contagion but take the financial
linkage and transmission mechanism as given in the model.
The study of the trade-o↵ between contagion and risk sharing is important but still
limited. Stiglitz (2010b) outlines a simple model to study the trade-o↵ and shows
that under incomplete market and non-convex technology, autarky is preferable
when there are only two extreme conditions: full financial integration and financial
autarky. And Stiglitz (2010a) illustrates that the trade-o↵ exists and raises the
di culty of designing an optimal capital market architecture. Grilli et al. (2014a)
and Grilli et al. (2014b) study the trade-o↵ on the firm and bank level, and indicate
that a high degree of connectivity tends to generate bankruptcy cascades. Some
studies find contradictory results regarding whether a more connected inter-bank
market increases the chance of bankruptcy. Ladley (2013) shows that the co-existing
phenomenon of contagion and risk sharing on the inter-bank market explains this
phenomenon. Gallegati et al. (2008) also suggest that financial links that formed to
share risk become a primary cause of subprime mortgage crisis. For the monetary
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union, Auray and Eyquem (2014) show that in a second best environment with
nominal rigidities, home bias and asymmetric shocks, financial integration could
cause welfare reversal even if Arrow-Debreu securities exist.
This paper follows the existing literature on the study of the trade-o↵ but with
a more general macroeconomic setup. The model also incorporates the following
stylised facts. First, consumers share risk domestically and internationally. Sec-
ond, there is a surge of international debt in many advanced economies. Third, the
impacts of global financial crises on consumers are asymmetric. Since this paper
focuses on financial integration and its byproducts, I simplify the goods market by
restricting the model to an endowment economy. In addition, there is an interest-
ing phenomenon that is overlooked in the previous literature, that consumers in
countries with current account deficits and surpluses seem to be impacted asym-
metrically by the recent financial crisis. Figure 4.1 displays the annual growth rate
of household final consumption expenditure per capita. It is obvious that countries
with current account surplus and deficit are impacted by the 2007-2008 financial
crisis di↵erently. As shown in subfigure 4.1a, household consumption decreases sig-
nificantly in 2007 in countries with current account deficits, and as in subfigure 4.1b,
the consumption is relatively stable in economies with current account surplus. The
only outlier is Russia, where household consumption drops drastically. However,
the decrease should be attributed to its complex political situation rather than the
recent financial crisis.
(a) Countries with current account deficit (b) Countries with current account surplus
Figure 4.1: Household consumption expenditure per capita growth
Data source: World Development Indicators
Data series: Annual growth rate of household final consumption expenditure per capita
There is a strand of literature recording financial integration and global imbalances.
Many studies approach the problem from the case of the US and suggest that mis-
alignments in economic policy between the US and the rest of world, especially
emerging economies caused by the problem. Obstfeld and Rogo↵ (2005) attribute
the imbalances to exchange rate misalignment and more importantly exchange rate
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policy. They also raise that in order to re-balance the national accounts, policy
coordination on both sides of the imbalances is necessary. Blanchard et al. (2005)’s
model also shows that fixed exchange rate policy in other countries not only dampens
American trade deficits but also further increases the demand for US assets. Krug-
man (2007) points out that the high level of external debt in the US is potentially
damaging the position of the dollar. If it is true, the sharp depreciation of dollar
will do great harm to the global economy. Asymmetry presence of capital controls
can also explain part of the global imbalances. In Prades and Rabitsch (2012)’ two
country model, US’s external debt position can be rationalised by noting that the
degree of openness in the rest of world di↵er from the US.
Studies argue that di↵erences in countries’ productivity, demographics, financial
development caused the imbalances. Smith and Prescott (2010) present significantly
di↵erence (4%) in returns on direct investment of the US and returns on investment
in the US. The intangible assets include technology play a key role in the di↵erences.
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) argue that global capital flows do not necessarily go
to regions with high productivity which raises an allocation puzzle, but the puzzle
can be partially explained from saving decisions. With a theoretical framework,
Caballero et al. (2008) show that with structural shocks on global capital flows,
heterogeneity in countries’ ability to produce financial assets causes di↵erences in the
equilibrium level of interest rates and hence global imbalances. Mendoza et al. (2009)
suggest that di↵erences in financial development between countries can explain the
trend of financial integration, the decline in the US net foreign asset position and
changing portfolio composition of US net foreign assets. With the examples of
several Asian countries, Cooper (2008) indicates that dramatic demographic changes
in many countries change people’s saving and investment behaviour and influence
national saving level significantly.
The data and previous studies motivate us to consider both country and consumer
heterogeneity. I set up a Huggett (1993) type heterogeneous agent model with dif-
ferent types of countries and formalise two types of countries: Type I countries have
a high domestic equilibrium interest rate and run a current account deficit; Type II
countries have a low domestic equilibrium interest rate and current account surplus.
The main findings indicate that lenders and borrowers in countries with current ac-
count surpluses and deficits respond to the financial crisis asymmetrically.I outline
the model and solution strategy in section 4.2. Results and policy implications are
discussed in section 4.3. I conclude the paper in the last section.
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4.2 Model
4.2.1 Model environment
This paper introduces heterogeneity in countries in addition to heterogeneity in
consumers, which is largely overlooked in the previous literature. Studies built on
the Bewley-Aiyagary-Huggett type of models usually adopt heterogeneous household
setting. The di↵erences in realised income are the main driver of agent heterogeneity.
Some literature extends this line of work by introducing other types of heterogeneity
such as preference, health status or marriage status. Heathcote et al. (2009)’s survey
provides a comprehensive summary of heterogeneous household literature. More
recent studies such as Bai and Zhang (2012, 2010) and Castro and Koumtingu
(2014) further extend the model to study heterogeneous countries, but consumers
within a country are assumed to be identical.
In the model, the world consists of n countries, denoted as country j ⇢ {1, 2, ..n}
. Each country has a continuum of infinitely lived consumers with a total mass of
one, represented as i ⇢ (0, 1) and many banks. The income level and probability
to transit between employment and unemployment di↵er across countries. Within
a country, consumers receive full level of endowment when employed and a lower
level of endowment during unemployment. The market is incomplete in the sense
that no Arrow securities are present and there is a natural borrowing limit. There
are financial intermediaries (FI) providing bond contracts. FIs are risk neutral and
competitive, and they discount the future flows at the competitive interest rate.
To tackle the uncertainty in endowment, consumers trade bonds. In a standard
Huggett (1993) model, which is also the benchmark model, the equilibrium interest
rate clears the domestic bond market.
Given that the endowment process is di↵erent across countries, the domestic interest
rate di↵ers. With financial integration, countries can borrow and lend internation-
ally. Thus, there is a world interest rate that clears the global credit market and
deviates from countries’ equilibrium levels of interest rates. In an open economy,
FIs behave the same as in a closed economy but manage international bond trading.
Subsequently, given that countries have open capital markets, some countries would
which are borrowers would run negative credit balances and some which are lenders
would have positive credit balances. The balance sheets of FIs are linked by the
cross-holding of debt.
There are studies based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) which examine the reasons
for bank failure. They find that the bank failure is usually caused by liquidity
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mismatch in incomplete markets. I model the crisis in an ad hoc approach since the
origin of the crisis is not the focus of this paper. Financial crisis is introduced as
an unusual event that has zero probability of happening in which one of the banks
need to pay a lump sum of asset to an outsider. In such case, the deterioration of
bank balance sheets spreads to other financial institutions through the interbank
market, and that causes market failure: lenders lose their wealth and borrowers lose
access to the credit market. The event allows us to observe if financial integration
changes the impacts of the banking crisis on countries with di↵erent characteristics.
In the following subsections I specify the problems faced by consumers and financial
intermediaries, the timing of the model, and the equilibrium conditions.
Consumers
Consumers face idiosyncratic shocks to their endowment and choose consumption
and bond holding to maximise their utility given the budget constraint. The bond
price di↵ers between countries and thus the budget constraints faced by consumers
in di↵erent countries are di↵erent. The consumers’ problem for country j can be
written as:
max E0
1X
t=0
 tu(cij,t) (4.1)
s.t. cij,t + qj,tbij,t+1  eij,t + bij,t where cij,t   0 and bij,t    bj (4.2)
where c is the consumption, e is the endowment, b is the bond holding, q is the
bond price, and   is a time-invariate discount factor. The subscript ij denotes the
consumer i in country j and t denotes time. The non-negativity constraint binds
consumption and there is a limit on borrowing b. The utility function satisfies the
Inada conditions and is concave. I can rewrite the problem in recursive form.
Vij(eij, bij, qj) = max u(cij) +  
X
e0|e
⇡(e0|e)V 0ij(e0ij, b0ij, q0j) (4.3)
s.t. cij + qjb
0
ij  eij + bij where cij   0 and bij   bj (4.4)
I suppress the time notation t for the current period and use letters with primes
representing values in the next period. ⇡(e0|e) is the probability transition matrix
of the endowment.
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Financial intermediaries
I model one type of financial intermediaries, a bank, and use the word “bank” and
FI interchangeably. There are many competitive, risk neutral, homogeneous FIs in
a country, and I denote a representative FI in country j as FIj. In closed economies,
FIs break even at the bond price schedule
qj = 1/Rj. (4.5)
In open economies, the global market clears at the world interest rate and the bond
price adjusts accordingly as
qj = 1/R
⇤ (4.6)
where R⇤ is the world interest rate.
Timing of the model
The timing of the model is summarised in figure 4.2. At the beginning of each
period, the endowment for individual consumers is realised. FIs repay loans and
receive payments from other FIs. Following the clearance of credit in the interbank
market, FIs make payments to consumers respectively and the returns to bond
holding from last period are realised.
In the middle of the period, the FIs announce the bond price for the next period
and consumers make consumption and bond holding decisions accordingly. Given
each country’s demand for credit, FIs clear the global credit markets first and the
domestic credit markets afterwards.
Realisation of eij.
Global market clears for last period investment
Domestic market clears for last period investment
Realisation of bij
Global market clears for current period investment.
Domestic market clears for current period investment.
Banks announce qj.
Consumers decide cji and b0ij.
Figure 4.2: Timing
Equilibrium
The state space of an individual country j is Sj = Bj ⇥ Ej where Bj and Ej are
possible values for bond holding and endowment for country j. Let  j(e, b) be the
joint distribution of endowments and bonds in country j’s population.
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Let µj be the probability measure on (Sj,  S,j) and  S,j be the Borel  -algebra on
Sj. For M ⇢  S,j, µj(M) ) indicates the mass of consumers whose states lie in M in
country j. Define the transition function Pj for country j: Sj ⇥  S,j ! [0, 1]. Thus
Pj(x,M) is the probability that a consumer with state x will have an individual
state vector lying in M in the next period.
Definition 4.2.1 An equilibrium without financial integration consists of a sequence
of distribution for { j}, a bond price schedule {qj}, and decision rules of consumers
{c(e, a; q), a0(e, a; q)} for each country j ⇢ n such that given the initial distribution
of  o:
• Given qj, cj(e, a) and b0j(e, a) are optimal.
• Given R⇤ and decision rules, banks and international financial intermediaries
break even for the asset price schedule.
• The bond market clears RSj a0dµj = 0.
• µj is the stationary probability measure: µj(M) =
R
Sj
Pj(x,M)dµj for all
M ⇢  S,j.
In open economies, countries can run a current account deficit or surplus and thus
the domestic bond market does not necessarily need to clear as long as there is no
excess or scarcity in the world credit market. Hence, there is a unique world price
for the bond qj = q⇤ = 1/R⇤ 8 j. Given q⇤, the world bond market clears as
nX
j=1
Z
Sj
a0dµj = 0
In summary, the model is di↵erent from a standard Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari type
of setup becase of the introduction of country in addition to consumer heterogeneity.
The structure of linkages among FIs is circular and in line with the literature on
interbank networks. The FIs’ decisions form a parallel problem to consumers’ utility
maximisation problem.
4.2.2 Solution method
The problem can not be solved analytically and thus I use computational methods
for the problem. Conventional computational methods use value or policy iteration
to solve problems with heterogeneous agents. The value iteration method fixes a
grid for b and iterates on V (b0) until a fixed point is found for the value function V (b)
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for each possible endowment value and given the bond price. An improved version
is stationary Markov policy iteration where researchers can directly approximate
the optimal policy function b0 = g(b). I adopt Carroll (2006)’s endogenous grid
method (EGM) to solve the model. The EGM significantly improves the e ciency of
computation without compromising accuracy by exploiting the optimality condition.
Expectations are not computed for non-used grid points in the final interpolation.
In the model, the optimal policy for consumption can be characterised by the Euler
equation:
u0(cij)    RjEt[u0(c0ij)].
The equality holds when the borrowing constraint is not binding. The occasion-
ally binding constraint imposes non-linearity on the problem. Instead of creating
gridpoints for the policy functions, the EGM allows us to generate consumption de-
cisions from a predetermined grid of values of “cash in hand”. For a given interest
rate, I build a fixed grid for bond holding next period and obtain “cash in hand”
= eij + Rjb0ij for each possible endowment value. Then I start with a guess for the
consumption next period c0ij, and the value of current consumption is determined by
the inverse Euler equation 4.7. I interpolate the consumption to the cash in hand
value and find the optimal level of consumption by comparing values of the old and
new guesses. The bond holding decisions bij are easy to derive from here. I can
calculate the invariant distribution of bonds for country j from consumers’ bond
holding decisions. Lastly, I find the interest rate that clears the market.
cij   u0 1( RjE(u0(c0ij))) (4.7)
To summarise, the algorithm to solve the problem is as follows:
1. Guess an interest rate.
2. Given the interest rate, solve the optimal policy of each country cj(e, b) by
iterating the Euler equation on a discrete grid of bonds b0ij for employment
and unemployment situations.
3. Derive the inverse of the bond accumulation policy from the optimal policy
function from step two and find the invariant distribution of bonds. The law
of motion of  j follows
 j(b
0
,e
0) =
X
e⇢Ej
X
b  bj
 j(b, e)pj(e
0|e)
4. Use the bisection method, which repeatedly halves the interval and selects the
sub-interval that fits the evaluation criteria, to find the equilibrium level of
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interest rate that clears the global credit market
nX
j=1
Z
Sj
b0dµ = 0
4.2.3 Calibration
To ease the computation, I formalise two types of countries: type I is a more ad-
vanced economy with a high endowment level, lower probability of transiting to
unemployment and a higher chance of finding a job; type II countries are less ad-
vanced economies. Half countries are type I and the other half are type II.
I summarise the calibration of the model parameters in table 4.1. Utility takes the
CRRA form of u(c) = c
1  
1   . For the transition matrix between employment and
unemployment for type I countries, I use the estimated value from Shimer (2005).
As comparing to type I, type II countries are less developed, so I set a lower value
Parameter Description Value
  Discount factor 0.98
  Coe cient of relative risk aversion 2
Type I country
eh Level of endowment during employment 1
el Level of endowment during unemployment 0.25
Pe,u Transition probability to unemployment 0.057
Pu,e Transition probability to employment 0.882
Type II country
eh Level of endowment during employment 0.6
el Level of endowment during unemployment 0.25
Pe,u Transition probability to unemployment 0.157
Pu,e Transition probability to employment 0.782
Table 4.1: Model calibration
for the level of endowment during employment, and higher probability of staying in
and transiting to unemployed. I use the natural borrowing limit bj = el,j/Rj which
is the maximum amount that a consumer in country j can repay in the next period
given that he is unemployed.
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Benchmark model and financial openness
In the benchmark model, I solve a standard Huggett (1993) model with natural
borrowing limits. Then I introduce the international credit market by allowing excess
demand or supply in individual countries but clearing the global credit market at the
world interest rate. The relationship between the deficit in the local credit market
for type I countries is shown in figure 4.3a and for type II countries in 4.3b. The
equilibrium interest rates for two countries in financial autarky are di↵erent: type I
countries have a higher competitive interest rate. As a consequence, if the capital
markets of both types of countries are open, both lenders and borrowers would
have arbitrage opportunities by lending or borrowing abroad. Type I countries will
demand credit from the international market due to high domestic interest rates and
type II countries will supply credit to the global market. The world interest rate is set
at the point where demand meets supply as shown in figure 4.3c: the international
credit is 0.1 with a gross interest rate of 1.01895. The model prediction fits the
stylised fact that, in most cases, the less advanced economies are the international
lenders while advanced economies are borrowers.
(a) Type I country (b) Type II country (c) World
Figure 4.3: Interest rates
I show the saving decisions of employed and unemployed consumers from both types
of countries in financial autarky and open economy scenarios in figure 4.4. The
downward adjustment after unemployment is larger while the upward adjustment
during employment is smaller in type I countries than in type II countries.
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(a) Type I country financial autarky (b) Type I country open economy
(c) Type II country financial autarky (d) Type II country open economy
Figure 4.4: Saving decisions
Figure 4.5 shows the stationary wealth distribution of both types of countries with
and without access to international financial market. With international asset trad-
ing, there are more borrowers in the type I country and more lenders in the type
II country. From the di↵erences in wealth distribution, we can infer that individual
consumers accumulate more savings in type II countries but more debts in type I
countries in an open economy.
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(a) Type I country financial autarky (b) Type I country open economy
(c) Type II country financial autarky (d) Type II country open economy
Figure 4.5: Wealth distribution
The variations in the distributions of wealth under financial autarky and integra-
tion show that current account deficits and surplus are not only an issue on the
aggregate level but change the optimal policy of individual consumers. In type I
countries, more consumers are on the lower borrowing limit and vulnerable to swings
in international capital flows. Challe and Ragot (2011) indicate that a lower than
equilibrium level of interest rates may lead to price bubbles which could cause self-
fulfilling crisis. The accumulation of wealth is significantly higher under financial
integration in type II countries and thus consumers are exposed to financial risks in
both domestic and international markets.
4.3.2 Model simulations and banking crisis
There is a zero probability event, in which there is contagious banking crisis. There
are many probable channel of contagion, I present one potential channel, interlinked
financial intermediaries balanced sheet, based on Caballero and Simsek (2013).
The balance sheet of a FI in a open economy is presented in figure 4.6. LC and DC
are loans to and deposits from consumers respectively. FIs match the supply and
demand of credits within the country and across the country by receiving deposits
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and making loans. It is widely observed in the real world that banks hold assets
of other banks. Ashcraft et al. (2011) document extensive empirical evidence for
the interbank market and its role in the 2007 financial crisis. The paper suggests
that banks, especially small constrained banks, increase precautionary saving during
the crisis, which explains the sudden stop of interbank lending after the Lehman
bankruptcy. Following Caballero and Simsek (2013) and similar studies on bank
connectivity, I construct an interbank market, allowing FIs to borrow from or lend
to each other. I assume that the linkage between homogeneous intermediaries is
circular: each FI has a forward neighbour FI that holds its deposits and a backward
neighbour FI that holds its loan. ZFf is the one-period debt on the forward FI and
ZFb is the one-period debt held by a backward FI. To clear the interbank market,
ZFf = Z
F
b holds. The higher the value of cross-FI debt holding, the higher the
connectivity between FIs. The decision of cross debt holding and bond price is
separate from the consumer utility maximisation problem. However, consumers’
bond holding positions and the price schedule of financial institutions reach an Nash
equilibrium.
Asset Liability and capital
Consumer loans LC
Deposits in another FI ZFf
Consumer deposits DC
Deposits held by another FI ZFb
Figure 4.6: Bank balance sheet
I do not further discuss the channel of financial contagion in the model but take the
phenomenon as given. However, the mechanism of contagion, common exposure,
cross-holding of assets or the fire sale of assets, do not change the results significantly.
Similarly, the topology of FI linkages, circular or hierarchical has a limited impact
on the stability of credit markets in the model. The magnitudes of bank bu↵ers vary
with the financial architecture, but as long as the size of shock exceeds the bu↵er,
the pattern of the results remains the same given the assumption that the market
is not segmented. The reason for us to simplify the origin of the banking crisis and
the topology of financial linkages is not because those issues are unimportant. On
the contrary, the causes of financial crisis and the designs of financial architecture
play key roles in determining the resilience of financial markets. The frequency of
global financial crisis is a key determinant of the welfare trade-o↵ between contagion
and international risk sharing. However, the pattern of results, that consumers with
di↵erent wealth levels respond to the financial integration asymmetrically, holds as
long as financial crisis occurs in the model.
The banking crisis hits when one of the FIs receive a large negative shock ✓ on its
87
balance sheet at the end of the day. The shock could be interpreted as a lump
sum payment to an outsider. This shock is contagious through financial markets.
Consumers’ claims on the bank assets have priority. Thus as long as the size of shock
is smaller than the debt of the other bank and international financial intermediaries,
the payment to consumers will remain the same. If the shock would have a real
impact on consumption depends on the magnitude of the shock.8<:✓  ZFb There is no impact on consumption level.✓ > ZFf There is impact on consumption level.
The threshold value that if the shock will impact the consumption level is called the
bank bu↵er. The stability of the credit market is increasing with connectivity.
If the unusual shock exceeds the level of the bank bu↵er, lenders among consumers
can only recover a fraction ' of savings. To ease the computation, I set ' = 0
in the primary results and will change this in the sensitivity analysis. The credit
market shuts down in the following period. The world economy starts from the
beginning when all agents hold no bonds. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the transition
of consumption and bond holding after a surprising bank balance sheet shock for
simulated type I and type II countries respectively.
(a) Type I country Borrowers (b) Type I country Borrowers
(c) Type I country Lenders (d) Type I country Lenders
Figure 4.7: Transitions of Type I country
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Figures 4.7a and 4.7b show the transition of bond holding and consumption for a
representative borrower in the type I country. The solid line represents the condition
of an open economy and the dashed line that for a financial autarky economy. The
level of consumption drops rapidly after the shock and then moves back to the pre-
crisis level given that there is no other shock nor unemployment. The level of bond
holding moves up to zero from a negative value after the shock due to the inability
to access the credit market after the shock. The accumulation of wealth adjusts
upwards gradually afterwards. The sudden drop of consumption level is deeper in
an open economy since borrowers in type I country tend to accumulate more debts
as the world interest rate is lower than the domestic interest rate. Thus the cost of
losing access to the credit market is larger. For lenders, as shown in figures 4.7c and
4.7d, since there is less wealth accumulated in the open economy than in financial
autarky, the loss of wealth is smaller with financial openness. The sudden rise in
the consumption level is due to the inability to save, but the increase is followed by
a drop in consumption caused by a loss of wealth.
(a) Type II country Borrowers (b) Type II country Borrowers
(c) Type II country Lenders (d) Type II country Lenders
Figure 4.8: Transitions of Type II country
The e↵ects of financial integration on consumers in type II countries are opposite
to type I countries. As shown in figures 4.8a and 4.8b, borrowers accumulate less
wealth in the open economy as the world interest rate is higher than the domestic
rate. As a consequence, the sudden drop in consumption after a surprising shock
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is smaller. Figures 4.8c and 4.8c show the transition for the lenders: the drop in
consumption level is higher in the open economy since lenders make more loans
when the interest rate is higher.
Overall, there is no straight answer to the question whether financial openness allevi-
ates or deepens the cost of financial contagion. The impacts of financial integration
are asymmetric among lenders and borrowers in di↵erent types of countries. Even
though I set the banking crisis as a one-time event with zero probability of happen-
ing, it does repeatedly happen in modern economic history. To examine the welfare
trade-o↵ between risk sharing and financial contagion, I calibrate the frequency of
banking crisis 1 and simulate the model with reoccurring financial crises. However,
I still set financial crisis to be unpredictable by market participants. This seemingly
unrealistic assumption depicts the real world. Though there are several episodes in
which a financial tsunami hits a continent and more, mainstream economists and
investors still fail to predict the incidence of a financial crisis before it happens.
(a) Type I country Consumption
utility
(b) Type II country Consumption
utility
Figure 4.9: Consumption smoothing
Figure 4.9 presents welfare values for a simulated agent in type I and type II countries
given the level of countries’ current account and frequency of banking crisis. Given
that the model is with endowment economy, welfare only measures the smoothness
of consumption. There are five possible values in a linearly spaced vector from zero
to 2⇥ calibrated probability. For the value of the current account, I use the value of
financial autarky, the equilibrium level of countries’ current account under financial
integration and the midpoint value of the two. In the contour map, the lighter the
colour, the higher utility. Since the model is of an endowment economy, the welfare
mainly measures the level and smoothness of consumptions in the country. Figure
4.9a shows the welfare for type I countries. It is obvious that welfare decreases as the
chances of the banking crisis go up. However, when there is a positive probability
1I calibrate the frequency of the unusual state based on the incidence of banking crisis. Reinhart
and Rogo↵ (2011) provides a database for a variety of crises for seventy countries from 1800 to
2010. The calibrated frequency of banking crisis using data from 1900 to 2010 is 0.0755.
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of a banking crisis, the welfare trade-o↵ of financial openness is ambiguous. For
type II countries, as shown in figure 4.9b, welfare decreases when there is a higher
probability of a banking crisis given all levels of the current account. Nevertheless,
the relationship between the current account and welfare is not monotonic. Overall,
the interplay between international risk sharing as approximated by the level of the
countries’ current accounts and the contagion caused by the incidence of a banking
crisis is complicated as there is no apparent pattern on the level of consumption
utility.
4.3.3 Policy interventions
I discuss the e↵ectiveness of two types of policies that are widely used by policy-
makers: one aims to avoid a domino e↵ect of bank defaults when a crisis occurs,
for example quantitative easing (QE), and the other one is designed to improve the
stability of the financial market by reducing the size of the debt. Macro-prudential
policy and capital controls fit the second type.
Quantitative Easing
Quantitative easing (QE) aims to inject credit to the economy when the financial
market is in distress. This paper models quantitative easing as releasing credits to
the economy when a banking crisis occurs. Hence, instead of being cut o↵ from
borrowing capacity, consumers are able to borrow from the government. QE does
not change the equilibrium level of the interest rate or the wealth distribution.
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(a) Type I country Bond holding (b) Type I country Consumption
(c) Type II country Bond holding (d) Type II country Consumption
Figure 4.10: Quantitative easing
The solid lines in figure 4.10 are the transition of asset and consumption when there
is an injection of credits with QE, and the dashed lines are when there is no pol-
icy intervention. Borrowers cannot borrow in the period after the crisis, and as a
consequence, there will be a sudden and significant drop in consumption depending
on the original debt level. If the governments can provide additional credit to the
economy and allow the debtors to borrow, it will help countries to smooth consump-
tion. The drop in consumption is smaller as the asset level does not need to hit zero
borrowing within a period as shown in figures 4.10b and 4.10d. For lenders in the
economies, conducting QE does not change their post-crisis consumption. Besides,
if the governments recover the cost of QE gradually by imposing a small tax on
consumption or asset returns, the overall utility will improve because consumers in
the country are risk averse and benefit from consumption smoothing. However, one
underlying assumption of the model of QE is that credits provided by the govern-
ment are endowment equivalent, not just paper money. Since I do not model price
explicitly, the helicopter drop of money has no influence on the real economy or the
consumption level.
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Macro-prudential policy and capital controls
Both macro-prudential policy and capital controls aim to decrease the level of lever-
age, especially that of international debt. Since the primary purpose of macro-
prudential policy is to limit the leverage ratio, this paper models it as an ad hoc
borrowing limit which is smaller than the natural one. Following the literature, I
model capital controls as the tax on capital gains. Both policies change the equilib-
rium level of interest rates for domestic and international credit markets. The policy
function and stationary distribution of bonds alter accordingly. Whether the policies
are imposed unilaterally or bilaterally does not significantly change the mechanism
of the policies.
(a) Macroprudential policy (b) capital controls
Figure 4.11: Equilibrium interest rates with policy interventions
I set 90% of the natural borrowing limit as an ad hoc borrowing constrant and 5%
as the tax on capital gains. Figure 4.11 shows the world interest rates with policy
interventions. The equilibrium level of countries’ current account deficit and surplus
remains close to the level without policy interventions. With macro-prudential pol-
icy, demand for credit decreases, and thus interest rate falls. With the tax on capital
gains, interest rate jumps to motivate consumers to lend. Overall both policies re-
duce the gains from lending and thus decrease borrowing. Hence, the consumption
transition after a financial crisis is smoother with policy interventions because of
reduced borrowing. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 in the Appendix show the transition for
consumption and bond holding for borrowers and lenders in type I and II coun-
tries. As predicted, the sudden drop in consumption after the banking crisis with
macro-prudential policy and capital controls, as shown with solid lines, is smaller
comparing to the no policy scenario.
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4.3.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, I assign di↵erent values to three key parameters and examine whether
the results are robust to alterations in calibration.
(a) Higher relative risk aversion (b) Lower subjective discount factor
Figure 4.12: Equilibrium interest rates with di↵erent calibrations
First, I assign a higher value for consumers’ degree of risk aversion by setting   = 4.
In this case, consumers prefer to save more to cope with the uncertainty in the
endowment. Hence, the supply of credit increases, which lowers the equilibrium
level of interest for the world credit market as shown in figure 4.12a. Second, I set
a lower discount factor   = 0.89, which means that consumption in the future is
more heavily discounted. In this case, consumers are more likely to borrow and
drive up the interest rate as in figure 4.12b. Third, I change the parameter ' which
represents the liquidation cost of assets during financial distress. The change in the
liquidation cost does not change the equilibrium level of the interest rate. Instead
of losing all accumulated assets, lenders lose some of their wealth. The pattern of
transitions for bond and consumption does not di↵er significantly from the main
results as shown in the Appendix figures 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17. Overall, though it is
not certain that the results hold for all of the parameter space, the main results are
robust for other conventional calibrations.
4.4 Conclusion
As far as I know, there is limited literature directly exploring the impact of financial
integration on consumers with di↵erent wealth status (being a borrower or lender).
One reason behind this is that there is little data on consumption or investment
decisions for consumers with di↵erent asset levels. The US consumer expenditure
survey provides consumption levels for people from various age, racial and income
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groups, but there is no categorisation based on accumulated wealth. The paper tries
to fill this gap in the literature from a theoretical perspective.
In this paper, I study two main by-products of financial openness, contagion and
risk sharing. I set up a heterogeneous agent model with di↵erent country charac-
teristics. Consumers in the country can trade bonds and share risk domestically
and internationally. Type I countries with higher endowments and a more stable
employment environment are more likely to be international borrowers with current
account deficits. Type II countries are international lenders. There is a unique
equilibrium interest rate that clears the global credit market. The structure of fi-
nancial arrangements is facilitated by internatinal financial intermediaries. When
there is only endowment risk associated with unemployment, the arrangements help
consumers smooth consumption and share endowment risk. However, when there
is a banking crisis, which is contagious through financial markets, some consumers
face higher losses with international bond trading. Since the world interest rate is
lower than the domestic rate in type I countries, borrowers in type I countries tend
to accumulate more debts in open economy and face higher loss in global financial
distress, while lenders in type I countries face lower loss as they tend to accumulate
less wealth in a low-interest rate environment. For type II countries, world interest
rate is higher than the domestic market interest rate, and hence lenders tend to over-
accumulate wealth and borrowers take fewer loans in the open economy. Overall the
impacts of financial openness on how consumers tackle financial crisis is asymmetric
among consumers with di↵erent characteristics and country. I also calibrate the
historical probability of banking crisis to see the overall welfare trade-o↵ between
international risk sharing and financial contagion, and find that the relationship is
ambiguous. When deciding whether to adopt financial-liberalisation regime or how
open should financial markets be, policymakers should consider the distribution of
the wealth of consumers as well as countries’ current account status. If only two
choices, full financial integration and financial autarky are given, this chapter sug-
gests that a decision matrix as table 4.2. In type I countries with more borrowers,
financial autarky is preferable, and in type I countries with more lenders, financial
integration is preferable. The reverse is true for type II countries. Given the het-
erogeneous nature of consumers in countries, a re-distributional policy should be
considered at the same time.
More borrowers More lenders
Current account surplus Financial autarky Financial integration
Current account deficit Financial integration Financial autarky
Table 4.2: Policy implication
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This paper discusses several potential policies that aim to help countries transit
through global financial crises more smoothly. The results suggest that QE, macro-
prudential policy and capital controls can potentially improve the smoothness of
consumption. However, for QE to be e↵ective, governments need to inject credit
that is exchangeable with endowments, not just paper money. Thus the conducting
of QE requires the government to have real savings. I cannot be sure that the results
hold for all of the parameter space, but I experiment on several sensitivity analyses
to make sure the results hold for other conventional calibrations. Comparing to the
benchmark calibrations, the same pattern of results holds for higher risk aversion
coe cients, lower discount factors and lower liquidation costs.
In summary, the model focuses on the trade-o↵ between the benefits and costs of
financial integration. With an incomplete market and heterogeneous agent model,
I find that financial openness a↵ects agents with di↵erent characteristics di↵erently,
and raise the importance of equality and redistribution when making policies relating
to financial integration. I simplify the goods market by assuming an endowment
economy, and thus the results are mainly driven by the over-accumulation of debt
and wealth on the private level. The issues of current account imbalances should
be examined not only on the aggregate level but also on how they influence private
saving decisions.
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4.5 Appendix
(a) Type I country
Borrowers
(b) Type I country
Borrowers
(c) Type I country
Lenders
(d) Type I country
Lenders
(e) Type II country
Borrowers
(f) Type II country
Borrowers
(g) Type II country
Lenders
(h) Type II country
Lenders
Figure 4.13: Macro-prudential policy transitions
Figure 4.13 shows the transition of bond holding and consumption for consumers
under financial integration. In the benchmark scenario (dashed line), there are no
policy interventions, and the real line shows the condition when the macro-prudential
policy is implemented. The four sub-figures at the top show the transition of a
representative borrower (top-left two figures) and lender (top-right two figures) in
type I countries. Comparing to the scenario without policy interventions, macro-
prudential policy improves the smoothness of consumption as the sudden drop in
consumption is smaller. The four sub-figures in the second row display the transition
for type II countries. The macro-prudential policy is e↵ective since it reduces the
dent in consumption.
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(a) Type I country
Borrowers
(b) Type I country
Borrowers
(c) Type I country
Lenders
(d) Type I country
Lenders
(e) Type II country
Borrowers
(f) Type II country
Borrowers
(g) Type II country
Lenders
(h) Type II country
Lenders
Figure 4.14: Capital controls transitions
Figure 4.14 shows the transition of bond holding and consumption for consumers
under financial integration. In the benchmark scenario (dashed line), there are no
policy interventions, and the real line shows the condition when a capital tax is
imposed. The top four sub-figures are for type I countries and the bottom four are
for type II countries. Though not significant in the graph, 5% of capital tax reduces
equilibrium level of borrowing and lending and thus limits the size of the sudden
drop in consumption during a financial crisis.
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(a) Type I country
Borrowers
(b) Type I country
Borrowers
(c) Type I country
Lenders
(d) Type I country
Lenders
(e) Type II country
Borrowers
(f) Type II country
Borrowers
(g) Type II country
Lenders
(h) Type II country
Lenders
Figure 4.15: Sensitivity analysis  
Figure 4.15 shows the transition of bond holding and consumption for consumers
under financial autarky (dashed line) and integration (real line). The pattern of
results is in line with the main results in which the degree of risk aversion is lower.
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(a) Type I country
Borrowers
(b) Type I country
Borrowers
(c) Type I country
Lenders
(d) Type I country
Lenders
(e) Type II country
Borrowers
(f) Type II country
Borrowers
(g) Type II country
Lenders
(h) Type II country
Lenders
Figure 4.16: Sensitivity analysis  
Figure 4.16 shows the transition of bond holding and consumption for consumers
under financial autarky (dashed line) and integration (real line). The pattern of
results is in line with the main results in which the discount factor is higher.
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(a) Type I country Lenders (b) Type I country Lenders
(c) Type II country Lenders (d) Type II country Lenders
Figure 4.17: Sensitivity analysis '
Figure 4.17 shows the transition of bond holding and consumption for consumers
under financial autarky (dashed line) and integration (real line). The changes in
liquidation cost do not a↵ect borrowers and thus only the transition of borrowers
are presented. The top two sub-figures shows the consumption and bond holding
dynamics of lenders in type I countries. And the two sub-figures at the bottom show
the consumption and bond holding dynamics of lenders in type II countries. The
results are in line with the main results in which the liquidation cost is higher.
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION
This thesis includes three studies on di↵erent areas of monetary and international
economics. The studies cover important issues regarding monetary policy such as ex-
change rate regime, monetary policy regime and financial integration. This chapter
summarises the main findings of the thesis and their policy implications.
The second chapter studies the network e↵ects of countries’ ERR choices. Previ-
ous studies mainly use country-specific factors to explain countries’ exchange rate
regime choices. However, though some papers found strong correlation between
idiosyncratic factors and ERR choices, these factors cannot fully explain the con-
temporary movement of the choices. It is possible that large swings in regime choices
are caused by network e↵ects: a few countries change their ERR and other countries
follow. If this snowball e↵ect is true for countries’ decisions, we should be able to
observe spatial autocorrelations among countries’ ERR choices. I use spatial au-
toregressive multinomial probit model to test the spatial autocorrelation between
countries’ choices. The choice of ERR is the dependent variable, and the choices
of other countries are included in the right hand side of the regression together
with idiosyncratic factors. I need to specify a weighting matrix for the influence of
other countries’ choices. I use geographical distance, trade volumes to GDP and if
countries have shared a common coloniser in the past as the weighting matrix. The
idiosyncratic factors I used are common in previous studies, including OCA, political
and financial factors. I also provide an alternative treatment of eurozone countries
as the robustness check. I conduct several spatial analyses with di↵erent weighting
matrix. The spatial autocorrelation coe cients vary between 0.096 and 0.687 and
are mostly significant at the 99% level, suggesting that the spatial dependence is
positive and strong. Compared to other channels, trade better reflects the impact of
spatial interdependence for countries’ ERR choices and past colonial relationships
better reflect the network e↵ects for countries’ ERR and anchor currency choices.
Overall the signs of the parameters support the OCA theory in terms of trade open-
ness, the currency mismatch hypothesis in terms of the foreign debt to GDP ratio,
and Cobham (2010)’s argument in terms of financial development.
The results show that currency network e↵ects are strong: countries are likely to fol-
low the ERR choices of their major trade partners; and countries are likely to follow
the anchor currency and ERR choices of other countries if they have had a common
coloniser in the past. In addition, I re-examine the country-specific determinants
proposed by earlier studies and find some of them significant, suggesting that the
country’s choice of ERR is made under the influences of both other countries and
idiosyncratic factors. As currency network e↵ects are strong, countries would face
multiple equilibria which may lead to path dependence along with coordination fail-
ure, and thus are highly likely to be locked in suboptimal equilibria. Similar to the
example in Meissner and Oomes (2009)’s game theory model, though two countries’
optimal ERR choice is pegging to the euro (euro-euro choice), they may end up with
pegging to the USD (dollar-dollar choice) to avoid the dollar-euro or euro-dollar sit-
uation if they start from the dollar-dollar position. In most multi-equilibria games,
players may end up in a bad equilibrium but could improve their utilities by all
moving to a good equilibrium together. Countries might be better o↵ switching to
a di↵erent anchor simultaneously, but no country has an incentive to switch on its
own. Take southeast Asian countries as an example, most southeast Asian countries
peg to the USD, though they do not necessarily trade more with the USA. The
intra-east-Asia trade is of higher importance, but a large volume of intra-Asia trade
is denominated in the USD. Renminbi and the Yen should have played a larger role
in southeast Asian countries. In the meanwhile, with economic development and
political reforms, many southeast Asian countries have better political institutions
and financial infrastructure, making them ready to pursue free exchange rates and
independent monetary policy in the future. However, if any country switches to
free floats on its own, it will face disadvantages in global markets. In summary, the
findings on currency network e↵ects indicate that countries, especially small open
economies and emerging markets that fix their exchange rates, can achieve higher
welfare by escaping the suboptimal equilibrium and jointly choosing their ERRs
with their major partners through cooperation and negotiation.
In the third chapter, I am trying to answer the question why countries target the
particular variables they target by studying the determinants of countries’ MPRs.
In the aftermath of the end of the Bretton Woods system, many countries are not
exclusively concerned with inflation. Some countries target inflation directly and
some target other factors such as exchange rates to control it. My study focuses on
original OECD member countries, and in order to find the determinants, I develop a
chronology of de jure MPRs for early OECD member countries for the post-Bretton
Woods period. The main source of the classification is the survey sent to world
central banks from the BoE. OECD economic surveys of countries were the main
source for countries that did not reply to the Bank of England survey. Presentations
and studies on individual countries such as Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Mishkin
(2001), Gumundsson and Kristinsson (1997), Berg and Gro¨ttheim (1997), Sullivan
(2013) and Nascimento (2005) are referred to when there are conflicts in the main
sources. The detailed list of countries’ MPRs is in the appendix with the sources
of data. I select the potential determinants of countries’ MPRs from the literature.
The explanatory variables include economic size, trade openness, terms of trade
shocks, capital account openness, financial market development, financial institu-
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tions development, the polity index, being an oil exporter and historical inflation.
I also study the determinants of countries’ monetary policy arrangements based on
de facto analysis with Cobham’s (2015) classification as the cross-reference.
The results suggest that economic size, trade openness, financial development and
political environment all have a role in determining the MPR. The results are mostly
in line with the predictions from the OCA theory, the sustainability view of fixed
exchange rates, Broda (2004)’s assertion that term of trade dynamics are di↵erent
for oil exporting countries, the impossible trinity hypothesis in Obstfeld and Tay-
lor (2003), and the suggestion in Cobham (2010) that countries’ monetary policy
arrangements are linked with their financial infrastructure development. Country-
specific factors can also explain the de facto objectives of countries’ monetary policy
arrangements in some degree.
The fourth chapter studies two by-products of financial integration, international
risk sharing and financial contagion, with a theoretical model. I follow the existing
literature on the study of the trade-o↵ but with a more general macroeconomic
setup. The model incorporates the following stylised facts. First, consumers share
risk domestically and internationally. Second, there is a surge of international debt in
many advanced economies. Third, the impacts of global financial crises on consumers
are asymmetric. This paper introduces heterogeneity in countries in addition to
heterogeneity in consumers, which is largely overlooked in the previous literature.
I set up a Huggett (1993) type heterogeneous agent model with di↵erent types of
countries and formalise two types of countries: Type I countries have a high domestic
equilibrium interest rate and run a current account deficit; Type II countries have
a low domestic equilibrium interest rate and current account surplus. Consumers
maximize their consumption utility subject to the budget constraint. FIs provide
the bond contracts to help consumers tackle idiosyncratic endowment risks. FIs are
able to borrow from or lend to each other, and the linkage between homogeneous
FIs is circular. I use the endogenous grid method (EGM) to solve the model. With
international asset trading, there are more borrowers in the type I country and
more lenders in the type II country. From the di↵erence in wealth distribution, we
can infer that individual consumers accumulate more savings in type II countries
but more debts in type I countries in an open economy. The variations in the
distributions of wealth under financial autarky and integration show that current
account deficits and surplus are not only an issue on the aggregate level but change
the optimal policy of individual consumers. In type I countries, more consumers are
on the lower borrowing limit and vulnerable to swings in international capital flows.
Challe and Ragot (2011) indicate that a lower than equilibrium level of interest rates
may lead to price bubbles which could cause self-fulfilling crisis. The accumulation
104
of wealth is significantly higher under financial integration in type II countries and
thus consumers are exposed to financial risks in both domestic and international
markets.
When there is only endowment risk associated with unemployment, the arrange-
ments help consumers smooth consumption and share endowment risk. However,
when there is a banking crisis, which is contagious through financial markets, some
consumers face higher losses with international bond trading. Since the world in-
terest rate is lower than the domestic rate in type I countries, borrowers in type
I countries tend to accumulate more debts in the open economy and face higher
loss in global financial distress, while lenders in type I countries face lower loss as
they tend to accumulate less wealth in a low-interest rate environment. For type II
countries, the world interest rate is higher than the domestic market interest rate,
and hence lenders tend to over-accumulate wealth and borrowers take fewer loans
in the open economy. I also calibrate the historical probability of banking crisis
to see the overall welfare trade-o↵ between international risk sharing and financial
contagion, and find that the relationship is ambiguous. I simplify the goods market
by assuming an endowment economy, and thus the results are mainly driven by the
over-accumulation of debt and wealth on the private level. Thus the issues of cur-
rent account imbalances should be examined not only on the aggregate level but also
on how they influence private saving decisions. When deciding whether to adopt
financial-liberalisation regime or how open should financial markets be, policymak-
ers should consider the distribution of the wealth of consumers as well as countries’
current account status. Chapter four suggests that in type I countries with more
borrowers, financial autarky is preferable, and in type I countries with more lenders,
financial integration is preferable. The reverse is true for type II countries. With
an incomplete market and heterogeneous agent model, we can see that financial
openness a↵ects agents asymmetrically, and raise the importance of equality and
redistribution when making policies relating to financial integration.
I summarise the topics, results and policy implications from the essays in table
5.1. The theme of this thesis to find the determinants of countries’ macro-monetary
regime. Normative determinants of a regime are factors that countries should con-
sider when making a choice, and positive determinants are factors that are being
taken into consideration by policymakers. The first two essays are empirical stud-
ies and find the positive determinants of countries’ ERR and MPR. The last essay
builds a theoretical framework and presents the normative determinants of countries’
financial-liberalisation regime.
As mentioned in the first chapter, there are many important issues in monetary and
international economics that are not covered in this thesis. Possible follow-up works
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of the thesis include studies on policy coordination of countries’ ERR, pure Bayesian
estimation of the network e↵ects of countries’ ERR choices, alternative estimation
of spatial multinomial model with copula based approaches as robustness checks,
alternative setup of the panel in countries’ MPR studies, lining the model in chapter
four with data and pinning down the optimal degree of financial integration.
Topic Methodology Main findings Policy implications
Exchange
rate regime
Empirical:
Spatial au-
toregressive
multinomial
probit model
The country’s choice of
ERR is made under the in-
fluences of both “neighbour-
ing” countries and idiosyn-
cratic factors.
Countries, especially small open
economies and emerging markets
that fix their exchange rates,
can achieve higher welfare by es-
caping the suboptimal equilib-
rium and jointly choosing their
ERRs with their major partners
through cooperation and negotia-
tion.
Monetary
policy
regime
Emprical:
Multinomial
Logit Model
The results of this study
suggest that economic size,
trade openness, historical
inflation, financial develop-
ment and political institu-
tions all have a role in de-
termining countries’ de jure
MPRs. Country-specific
factors can also explain the
de facto objectives of coun-
tries’ monetary policy ar-
rangements in some degree
Countries’ choices of MPR are
mostly in line with the predic-
tions from the OCA theory, the
sustainability view of fixed ex-
change rates, Broda (2004)’s as-
sertion that terms of trade dy-
namics are di↵erent for oil ex-
porting countries, the impossible
trinity hypothesis in Obstfeld and
Taylor (2003), and the sugges-
tion in Cobham (2010) that coun-
tries’ monetary policy arrange-
ments are linked with their finan-
cial infrastructure development.
Financial
integration
Theoretical:
Heteroge-
neous agent
model
Lenders and borrowers in
countries with current ac-
count surpluses and deficits
respond to the financial cri-
sis asymmetrically. More-
over, the relationship be-
tween financial integration
and consumption smooth-
ing is not monotonic.
When deciding whether to adopt
financial-liberalisation regime or
how open should financial mar-
kets be, policymakers should con-
sider the distribution of con-
sumers as well as countries’ cur-
rent account status. QE, macro-
prudential policy and capital con-
trols can potentially improve the
smoothness of consumption dur-
ing a banking crisis.
Table 5.1: Summary
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